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Abstract:  
In this article, we investigate risk return characteristics and diversification benefits when private 
equity is used as a portfolio component. We use a unique dataset describing 642 US-American 
portfolio companies with 3620 private equity investments. Information about precisely dated cash 
flows at the company level enables for the first time a cash flow equivalent and simultaneous 
investment simulation in stocks, as well as the construction of stock portfolios for benchmarking 
purposes. With respect to the methodology involved, we construct private equity, stock-benchmark 
and mixed-asset portfolios using bootstrap simulations. 
For the late 1990s we find a dramatic increase in the extent to which private equity outperforms 
stock investment. In earlier years private equity was underperforming its stock benchmarks. Within 
the overall class of private equity, returns on earlier private equity investment categories, like venture 
capital, show on average higher variations and even higher rates of failure. It is in this category in 
particular that high average portfolio returns are generated solely by the ability to select a few 
extremely well performing companies, thus compensating for lost investments.  
There is a high marginal diversifiable risk reduction of about 80% when the portfolio size is 
increased to include 15 investments. When the portfolio size is increased from 15 to 200 there are few 
marginal risk diversification effects on the one hand, but a large increase in managing expenditure on 
the other, so that an actual average portfolio size between 20 and 28 investments seems to be well 
balanced. We provide empirical evidence that the non-diversifiable risk that a constrained investor, 
who is exclusively investing in private equity, has to hold exceeds that of constrained stock investors 
and also the market risk. 
From the viewpoint of unconstrained investors with complete investment freedom, risk can be 
optimally reduced by constructing mixed asset portfolios. According to the various private equity 
subcategories analyzed, there are big differences in optimal allocations to this asset class for 
minimizing mixed-asset portfolio variance or maximizing performance ratios. We observe optimal 
portfolio weightings to be between 3% and 65%. 
JEL Code: G11 
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1.  Introduction 
Modern portfolio theory quantifies the benefits of diversification and demonstrates 
opportunities for improving the performance characteristics of portfolios by combining 
assets. Over the last years private equity (PE) has become more reputable within the field 
of alternative asset classes. By 1996 at the latest, worldwide capital commitments to PE 
funds were experiencing large increases. Nevertheless, the acceptance of PE as a capital 
investment alternative has lagged behind that of other asset classes like stocks, bonds or 
even real estate. Reservations about investing in private equity may be caused by several 
factors. Mainly, it has been low market transparency combined with the complexity of 
understanding both this market segment and the benefits of portfolio allocations to this 
asset class that have led to a certain reluctance to treat that enigma, namely private equity 
as an investment opportunity.  
Academic research that analyzes private equity with respect to portfolio 
management is rare. There are a large number of studies devoted to investigating the 
characteristics of stocks, bonds or real estate as portfolio components, but the 
unsatisfactory data situation does not particularly encourage the analysis of private equity 
assets in this context. Given a relatively inefficient private equity market, the logic of 
portfolio choice is, therefore, based mostly only on the premise that not all eggs should be 
placed in one basket. Very few approaches exist which try to make recommendations 
about optimal portfolio compositions which include private equity. Our innovative 
approach aims to remedy this situation. 
In this paper we analyze several private equity categories, we derive performance 
characteristics using empirical methods and find evidence on the benefits of adding 
private equity to a mixed-asset portfolio. This investigation is based on a dataset which is 
unique with respect to the depth of information it contains. The dataset provides to date 
exact information about 3620 investments made by 123 funds from 37 investment 
managers. Our analysis is based on actual cash flows to and from portfolio companies. We 
begin by simulating investments in individual benchmark stocks with the same timing. 
Thus, we observe exact benchmark performances in relation to private equity investments, 
both of which are measured by the internal rate of return (IRR). Due to the lack of suitable 
worldwide stock universes that can deliver benchmark stocks over the whole period from 
1970 to 2002, we have had to reduce the sample used to 643 US-American portfolio 
companies financed between 1980 and 2002. Each private equity investment is allocated 
to one benchmark stock from the Russell 2000 stock universe. Comparable PE and   2 
benchmark stock returns are used for bootstrap simulations of several pure and mixed 
asset portfolios in order to observe changes in risk-return characteristics. 
 Specifically, the analysis is organized in three steps. First, we assess several private 
equity categories and provide descriptive statistics. Since with respect to the private equity 
category we observe higher performance variation of venture capital investments 
combined with a higher average but a lower median return, we recognize the increased 
need for skilful investment choices when focusing on venture capital. In earlier times 
benchmark stock investments outperformed PE investments in terms of mean IRRs. It is 
only since the late 1990s that the overall private equity market has started performing 
much better. Research has yet to reveal whether this development is a result of a learning 
process or of improved market mechanisms like the establishment of better exit markets or 
the emergence of advisors. Will this outperformance continue, or is this merely a 
temporary bubble? If this is a temporary “exogenous shock”, then the individual 
investment ability of the PE manager will be decisive in ensuring that the higher non-
diversifiable pe-market risk is compensated. As a result, in the 'post bubble' market of the 
early 21st century we actually observe a run on participating established private equity 
funds. Investors have become cautious; they now search for high quality funds and refuse 
to invest in newcomers. Is this evidence of the investors' belief that the PE market is once 
again, on average, underperforming and of their need to find above average funds that will 
outperform the benchmark? 
In a second step we explore differences in the naive risk diversification of portfolios 
consisting of private equity or stocks. If we increase the portfolio size to number 15 
investments we observe strong marginal risk diversification. The complete reduction of 
diversifiable risk requires an inclusion of at least 200 investments in the portfolio. Whilst 
there is a small marginal risk reduction when the  portfolio size is increased from 15 to 
200, there is also a large increase in managing expenditure; so the actual average 
realworld portfolio size of between 20 and 28 investments seems to be well balanced. 
Following the new approaches of asset pricing published by Malkiel/Xu (2000) or 
Jones/Rhodes-Kropf (2002), we assume that a PE manager or a stock portfolio manager is 
constrained by his statute from holding all security classes and is, therefore, also 
precluded from holding the market portfolio predicted by the CAPM. We show using 
empirical methods that the non-diversifiable risk a constrained PE investor has to hold 
exceeds that of stock investors and also exceeds the market risk. It is referred to as the 
idiosyncratic risk premium of private equity portfolios.    3 
From the view of non-constrained investors, risk can be optimally reduced by 
constructing mixed asset portfolios. In a third step we, therefore, derive optimal 
allocations to private equity and its benchmark stocks in mixed-asset portfolios. 
Depending on  the private equity category involved, we look at changing optimal 
weightings of private equity in order to construct ‘minimum variance’ or ‘maximum 
performance ratio’ portfolios. Risk is reduced below the risk level that a constrained stock 
or PE investor has to hold. Results are robust if we use gross and net performance 
variables. Finally, a summary and conclusion are given. 
2.  Related literature 
Due to the unsatisfactory data situation research determining optimal PE portfolio 
constellations is rare. Therefore, we focus our literature review on related research, which 
has been carried out for two other asset classes: stocks and real estate. Given the similar 
characteristics of an investment in these asset classes, a comparison of empirical results 
indicating diversification benefits is worthwhile.  
a.  Optimal portfolio size 
 
 STOCK PORTFOLIOS 
Starting with Evans and Archner (1968), the financial literature demonstrates on an 
empirical basis the naive diversification effects of pure stock portfolios when the number 
of  assets included is increased. The authors first of all show that the connection between 
increasing portfolio size and portfolio risk takes the form of a rapidly decreasing 
asymptotic function.
1 They refute the notion that there is any economic justification for a  
portfolio that includes more than ten securities.
2 Portfolios were built by a random 
security selection and a mean portfolio return calculation taken from a database of 470 
stocks.  Evidence derived from similar empirical methods is given by Fisher and Lorie 
(1970) and Elton and Gruber (1977). They show that there is a reduction in diversifiable 
risk of between 84% and 88% if the stock portfolio size is increased by only 8 stocks. 
However, both studies find that there are further diversification effects if the portfolio size 
is increased by more than 8 stocks.
3 Recent research supports the efficiency of including 
more than 10 securities. An analysis of share price data between 1955 and 1984 by Poon, 
Tayler and Ward (1992) shows a further 23.86% risk reduction when the portfolio size is 
                                                 
1 See figure 3 and 8 for similiar results 
2 See Evans/ Archner (1968), pp. 766 
3  See Fischer / Lorie (1970), pp. 116 and Elton / Gruber (1977), pp. 426.   4 
raised from 10 to 25 stocks.
4 Hellevik and Hermann (1996) investigate naive risk 
diversification of securities traded on the German stock exchange between 1974 and 1994. 
They find in nearly all cases a risk diversification of 80% if the portfolio reaches a size 
between 9 and 19 securities.
5 Other studies by Tole (1982), Newbold and Poon (1993), 
and De Vassal (2001) contradict the usual assumption that a portfolio  of max. 25 stocks 
in size would be sufficiently diversified.
6 Using stocks from the Russel 1000 index to 
simulate portfolios De Vassal makes no certain recommendations about the optimal 
portfolio size, but he determines a portfolio size of up to 100 securities to be useful. 
REAL ESTATE PORFOLIOS 
There are various characteristics of private equity which correspond to those of real 
estate. Both assets are not traded in a permanent marketplace with quoted market prices, 
and both incorporate low liquidity and indivisibility. Furthermore, an investment in these 
asset classes is characterized by high transaction costs and information that is both limited  
in its public availability and has a highly asymmetric distribution .
7 In view of these 
similarities we give a review of real estate literature dealing with risk/return topics.  
Both Miles and McCue (1984) and Grissom, Kuhle and Walther (1987) find non-
systematic risk diversification effects of between 83% and 90%, respectively, when the 
portfolio size is increased to include 10 real estate objects.
8 The marginal risk 
diversification decreases rapidly if the portfolio size is raised beyond 10 properties. More 
recent studies recommend a larger portfolio size in order to achieve optimal risk 
diversification. Brown (1997) finds risk diversification to be at the same level as 
systematic risk for a portfolio size which ranges from 30 up to several hundred properties. 
He takes into consideration the high dispersion of individual real estate performances.
9 
Byrne and Lee (1999), using similar methodology, support these findings. They 
recommend a portfolio size of at least 200 properties.
10 Byrne and Lee (2000) even find 
empirical evidence to suggest that 400-500 properties are needed to reduce the risk of a 
property portfolio down to the market level.
11 Miles and McCue (1984), Hartzell, 
                                                 
4  See Poon / Taylor / Ward (1992), pp. 93. 
5  See Hellevik / Herman (1993), pp. 12. 
6  See Tole (1982), pp. 9; Newbould / Poon (1993), pp. 86; De Vasal (2001), pp. 35. 
7  See Kallberg, Lui and Greig (1996), pp. 359 ff. 
8  See Miles / McCue (1984), pp. 63; Grissom, Kuhle and Walther (1987), pp. 71. 
9  See Brown (1997), pp. 136 ff. 
10  See Byrne/Lee (1999), pp. 18. 
11  See Byrne/Lee (2000), pp. 12; In their recent study Byrne and Lee (2001) determine different risk attitudes 
connected with the management of large or small portfolios. They show next to decreasing non-systematic risk   5 
Heckman and Miles (1987), and Brown (1997) compare the relative levels of non-
systematic risk of real estate and stock portfolios. They indicate a non-systematic risk 
level between 90% and 94% for real estate and between 62% and 70% for stocks.
12 
According to the authors, these differences show a greater need for holding  real estate 
portfolios which are larger than stock portfolios in order to reach individual market risk 
levels. 
PRIVATE EQUITY PORTFOLIOS 
Due to the lag in suitable PE data there is only limited empirical research available 
which reveals the diversification effects of PE portfolios with increasing size. The 
management complexity of PE portfolios is mentioned by Statman (1987), Kanniainen 
and Keyschnigg (2000), and Cumming (2001). They suppose that the threshold of optimal 
portfolio size is reached when a further increase would lead to a  rise in marginal costs 
which is higher than that in marginal benefits. They determine factors influencing the 
portfolio size, but do not offer any recommendations with respect to optimal PE portfolio 
sizes.
13 Nor do any other studies provide empirically-based recommendations as  are made 
for other asset classes. Instead they are limited to investigations concerning the actual 
portfolio size of PE portfolios without answering the question about whether these are the 
optimal portfolio constellations. The 178 funds of CEPRES’ data sample (sample status, 
May 2003) have included an average of about 25 and a median of about 20.5 portfolio 
companies.
14 
b.  Optimal asset allocations to mixed portfolios  
 
STOCKS, BONDS AND REAL ESTATE 
A number of studies have presented evidence which argues that real estate is 
offering investors diversification benefits. Kuhle (1987) investigates the risk/return 
characteristics of mixed stock and real estate portfolios. He uses data from 26 Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REIT) and 42 common stocks to build mixed portfolios with changing 
asset allocations. He calculates performance ratios as the ratio between return and risk to 
examine the return/risk characteristics of mixed portfolios. His results show that the 
                                                                                                                                                          
an increasing systematic risk with increasing portfolio size. They attribute this effect to a larger number of riskier 
investments held in large portfolios. 
12 See Miles / McCue (1984), pp. 66; Hartzell / Heckman / Miles (1987), pp. 248; Brown (1997), pp. 138 
13 See Statman (1987), pp. 354; Kanniainen / Keuschnigg (2000), pp. 5; Cumming (2001), pp. 3. 
14 This is similar to the number of one specific fund's portfolio companies observed by other authors. Recent 
studies made by Ljungqvist / Richardson (2003) observed an average number of 22 portfolio companies in one 
fund, Reid / Terry / Smith (1997) indicate an average number of 28 (according to a survey of 20 funds).   6 
overall performance of mixed asset portfolios is not significantly different from that of 
portfolios consisting only of common stocks.
15 The exceptions are those mixed asset 
portfolios that contain at least a 2/3 share of REITs. However, these results are distorted 
because Kuhle constructs portfolios from data that combines single stocks and already 
diversified real estate portfolios (REITs).
16 Other studies published at this time, like Webb 
and Rubens (1987) or Webb, Curico and Rubens (1988), present similar results. They 
consider a 43% or respectively 66% investment in real estate to be the optimal 
allocation.
17 Brown and Schuck (1996) estimate via bootstrap simulations ex ante standard 
deviations, returns and correlations between stocks and real estate. They find an optimal 
allocation to real estate to be around 40% (portfolio size: 1000 assets). The impact of a 
changing overall portfolio size is also examined. The mean weighting of real estate which 
is required to achieve a minimum variance portfolio decreases to 14.2% with decreasing 
portfolio size (1 asset).
18 Liang, Meyer and Webb (1996) also used bootstrap simulations 
to build mixed portfolios. They cannot provide any reliable recommendation concerning 
the optimum composition of mixed-asset portfolios.
19 Making adjustments to their 
methodology, Ziobrowski, Cheng and Ziobrowski (1997) produce different conclusions. 
They show that investors with a low risk preference should not invest more than 10% of 
their portfolio's capital in real estate. This corresponds to the average investment size in 
real estate by institutional investors.
20 Data of superior quality are used by Kallberg, Lui 
and Greig (1996). They use exact cash flow data of real estate investments to calculate the 
modified internal rate of return (MIRR). In conclusion, they find a real estate allocation up 
to 9 per cent to be optimal, when they model the efficient frontier indicating the best 
risk/return characteristics of mixed stock, bond and real estate portfolios.
21 Ziobrowski 
and Ziobrowski (1997) also generate portfolios of financial and real estate assets and 
determine the efficient frontier. They recommend a higher allocation of about 20-30% to 
real estate. These findings correspond to those of Brinson, Diermeier and Schlarbaum 
(1986), whose results recommend a 20% investment share in real estate.
22 Using expected 
returns derived from an equilibrium model, Ennis and Burik (1991) find that the most 
                                                 
15  See Kuhle (1987), pp. 6. 
16  See Georgiev (2002), pp. 3 and 5. They show that the market prices used here for the REITs do not 
necessarily represent the underlying market value of the underlying assets and have a higher correlation to stock 
than to real estate performances. 
17  See Webb / Rubens (1997),pp 13 and Webb / Curico / Rubens (1988), pp. 446. 
18  See Brown/ Schuck (1996),pp. 68. 
19  See Liang/ Meyer/ Webb (1996), pp. 205. 
20  See Ziobrowski/ Cheng/ Ziobrowski (1997), pp. 703. 
21  See Kallberg/ Lui/ Greig (1996), pp. 367. 
22  See Brinson, Diermeier and Schlarbaum (1986), pp. 22   7 
efficiently diversified portfolios include real estate investments in the range of 10% to 
15% of total assets.
23  
PRIVATE EQUITY 
The low transparency of private equity markets and, the resulting unsatisfactory data 
situation make an exact comparison of the returns on PE and other asset classes difficult. 
In general, we have no annual returns for PE investments that are comparable to those of 
other assets with continually quoted market prices. There is only a series of cash flows 
with no intermediate values, which given a full distribution allows the annualized internal 
rate of return (IRR) to be calculated over the entire life of the investment. There are no 
studies  based on real cash flows that calculate PE IRRs and  at the same time the cash 
inflow equivalent IRRs of investments in other asset classes. Most studies use proxies to 
simulate characteristics of PE investments. The following studies have attempted to 
quantify the return/risk characteristics of PE, and some authors try to give a 
recommendation about the optimal allocation to PE.  
Probably the most famous investigation is that by Cochrane (2003), who analyzes a 
dataset from 1987 to 2000. He matches under certain assumptions information from two 
separate databases to calculate venture capital backed company returns. Cochrane only 
observes returns of portfolio companies which go public or out of business, but not of 
those that remain private.
24 He corrects for this sample bias by using maximum likelihood 
estimates to identify and measure the increasing probability of going public or being 
acquired. Without a selection bias correction he finds arithmetic average returns of 69.8%, 
and with bias correction average returns that decrease to 59%. Ljungquist and Richardson 
(2003) try to quantify PE fund performance using a superior data basis, but offer no 
evidence with respect to the optimal allocation to PE in mixed-asset portfolios. They use 
data collected from the portfolio of only one single investor. This dataset is in danger of 
including a selection bias. They explore IRRs measured on the basis of actual funds’ cash 
flow data. They do not have data at the company level and only make an approximation 
about whether the analyzed funds are completely realized.
25 Results indicate a simple 
weighted mean IRR for mature funds of around 20%. Using a repeated valuation model to 
correct for selection bias in the reporting of values, Quigley and Woodward (2002) try to 
                                                 
23  See Ennis/Burik (1991), pp. 27. 
24 See Cochrane (2003), table 1, next to the missing data of companies which remain private (45.5%),  Corranes’ 
sample just includes 9% lost investments. This is less than the number of lost investments in our sample and 
does not correspond to the usual default rates in venture capital.  
25 Ljungquist and Richardson (2003), pp. 6 ff.   8 
build a VC index for the period between 1987 and the first quarter of 2001. They focus on 
individual portfolio companies and find for mixed-asset portfolios (PE, stocks and bonds) 
an optimal allocation to PE to be between 10% and 15%.
26 McFall Lamm and Ghaleb-
Harter show that an investor should invest between 19% and 51% in PE.
27 Bader (1996) 
recommends under varying assumptions a PE allocation between 10% and 39%.
28  
Pradhuman, Kan and Chbani (2001) and Merrill Lynch (1995) all use small caps to proxy 
PE investments. These studies indicate benefits by investing 15% or 10% of total capital, 
respectively, in PE.
29 Superior data are used by Chen, Baierl and Kaplan (2002) to 
construct an efficient frontier. They use real IRR data from 148 PE funds that have been 
liquidated as of June 30, 1999.The earliest date of investment is January 1, 1960. No exact 
cash flow data were available to calculate comparable performances for other asset classes 
taking into consideration the exact investment timing. Their results produce an efficient 
frontier consisting of VC and the S&P 500 index that justifies allocations between 2% and 
9% to VC for constructing the minimum variance portfolio or maximum Sharpe ratio 
portfolio.
30 
3.  Data and methodology 
Benchmarking PE investment performances against those of other asset classes is 
difficult. In contrast to quoted assets with daily market prices there are only two 
occasions, the date of investment and the date of divestment, when a market-determined 
value is known for PE investments. If the historical series of cash flows over the entire life 
of investment after liquidation is known, then the annualized internal rate of return (IRR) 
can be calculated. Using an interim IRR based on net asset values to get annual rate of 
returns is just an estimation of reality. Thus, up until today with recent datasets, an exact 
comparison of PE (measured by the IRR as the annualized internal rate of return over the 
entire life of investment) and stock investment performance (measured by a volatile 
annual rate of return) was not possible.   
The dataset we use contains exact and complete information about 3619 PE 
investments made between 1970 and the end of 2002. We have access to precisely dated 
cash flows down to the company level, the exact assignment of every company to its fund 
and its investment manager and, furthermore, a large amount of investment manager, 
                                                 
26 Quigley/ Woodward (2002), pp. 22. 
27  McFall, Lamm and Ghaleb-Harter (2001), pp. 75. 
28  Bader (1996), pp. 208-210. 
29 Pradhuman, Kan and Chbani (2001), pp. 35.  
30 Chen, Baierl and Kaplan (2002), pp. 88.   9 
fund, and company-specific information. We are not confronted by selection bias like 
Cochrane owing to missing company data. Our sample includes all investment 
information made by the funds investigated, including those which remain private, are 
written off or are lost. This data is derived from the records of CEPRES’ Private Equity 
Analyzer which collects detailed PE data on a completely anonymous basis. Therefore, we 
do not know anything about the identity of the company, fund or investment manager. 
Nevertheless, the sample is well balanced. Table 1 presents the origin of the samples’ 
investment manager and portfolio companies. There is possibly a certain survivorship bias 
because data are derived mainly from those PE managers who have reported over the last 
years. From these general partners we also obtain information which describes their 
former mature funds. Unfortunately, we have no information about fund managers who 
were not in business until the mid 1990s. 
To avoid “estimation biases” due to the subjective valuation treatment we 
concentrate our study on completely liquidated investments with real cash flow history. 
This follows the approach used by Cochrane (2003).
31 Therefore, the overall dataset is 
reduced to 1539 completely realized, lost or written off investments.  
Information about the amount and date of all cash flows to and from the PE 
investments enables a cash flow equivalent and simultaneous investment simulation in 
stocks. For every single PE investment we choose another benchmark stock to simulate 
comparable performance (both measured in IRR).
32 In order to choose the right 
benchmark it is essential to find stocks from one homogeneous universe. There is no 
uniform small cap stock universe in Europe, South America and Asia that covers at least 
the last twenty years. All major stock indices covering small caps emerged in the last ten 
years. We, therefore, confine our research to US-American PE portfolio companies 
between 1980 and 2002 and draw benchmarks to US-American small cap stocks quoted 
within this period. The dataset is reduced to 642 US-American PE investments. The 
comparison between the complete and the reduced sample shows no significant 
differences in performance. The hypothesis of no difference in mean IRRs is not rejected. 
Table 2 presents a very low t-value. The sample includes PE investments from all 
financing stages: early-, expansion-, later stage, mbo/lbo, turnaround and mezzanine. 
Table 3 presents the sample's exact composition. The sample's portfolio companies are 
operating in a well-balanced industry range. The reduced sample's composition does not 
                                                 
31 See Chorane (2003), pp.3 
32 As it is recommended in Ehrhardt/ Koerstein (2001), pp. 455 or Barber/ Lyon (1997).   10 
deviate far from that of the complete sample. Thus, when we use the reduced sample we 
expect to find similar results to those obtained from analyzing the whole sample.   
Following the methodology of De Vassal (2001), we match a sample of firms which 
had been original constituents of the small-cap universe, Russell 2000. The Russell 2000 
measures the performance of the 2000 smallest companies of the Russell 3000 index and 
represents approximately 8% of its market capitalization. The Russell 3000 represents 
approximately 98% of the U.S. equity market available for investment. We divided the PE 
sample into two investment periods of 10 and 12 years between 1980 and 1990 and 1990 
and 2002, respectively. To benchmark PE investments which were made in the 80s we use 
original constituents of the Russell 2000 in its composition of the year 1980 and their total 
return performance through to the end of 2002. PE investments made between 1990 and 
2002 are allocated to original constituents of the Russell 2000 in its composition of the 
year 1990. For stocks of companies that did not survive the entire holding period of the 
allocated PE investment, we recognize the total return until the last reported stock price 
and simulate, in addition, a reinvestment in another size and industry-matched stock from 
the same index composition.  
Each PE portfolio company is acting in the same industry as its benchmark stock. To 
avoid size effects we ranked all PE investments according to their investment size and all 
stocks according to their market capitalization. By means of this ranking we allocated 
each PE investment to a comparable benchmark stock. Owing to large deviations in the 
stocks’ market capitalization and the PE investment costs, an exact size match was not 
possible.
33 
 In accordance with the described methodology, every PE investment is allocated to 
one stock in the same industry. A simulated investment of each PE cash flow in the 
allocated benchmark stock at same cash flow date and with a simultaneous divestment 
delivers exact benchmark IRRs. In particular, we created an investment in the benchmark 
stock with the same timing and amount, whenever a draw down or distribution on private 
equity company level occurred. The amount was translated in to a number of shares of the 
benchmark company by dividing the investment cash flow by the stock's current market 
price, i.e. buying shares for the equivalent amount at the current quote.  
 
                                                 
33 The average market capitalisation of one stock was around 29 million US-Dollar, the average financing costs 
of one private equity investment were around 9 million US-dollar.   11 
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Whenever a cash outflow, i.e. a disbursement to the fund’s investors occurred, we 
divided the positive company cash flow by the sum of all positive company cash flows to 
weigh the particular cash flow. We multiplied this fraction with the sum of all shares of 
the index and the current index level. As a result, a positive cash flow was created for the 
IRR calculation of the benchmark stock.  
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This approach creates a cash flow pattern for benchmark stocks that mimics the 
pattern of the underlying private equity company investment. Using this cash flow pattern, 
we can easily compute the IRR for the respective benchmark stock and thus obtain the 
performance the investor would have achieved if he had invested in the benchmarked 
company. Each PE IRR (PEn) has its counterpart benchmark IRR (Sn). There is no dilution 
of benchmark performances due to different investment periods or different performance 
measures. We overcome the usual problems of non-performance comparability between 
these two asset classes. 
We simulate portfolios built from a changing number of PE or stock investments by 
using the bootstrap methodology. We construct portfolios from equally weighted real PE 
investments and measure their cross-section mean return, volatility and other descriptive 
statistics. This approach does not take into account the different single starting points and 
the different capital weightings of investments carried out by real-life private equity funds. 
In this paper, however, we aim to simulate portfolios in order to examine the overall 
properties and dynamics of private equity investment performance patterns and not in 
order to evaluate the investment managers’ ability with respect to timing and capital 
weighting.
34 The bootstrap methodology used is described in the appendix.    
4.  Assessing private equity and its stock benchmark risk/return characteristics  
 
                                                 
34  Further discussion about the suitability of different methodologies, see Burgel (1998), pp. 33.   12 
SAMPLE PERIOD – Investments between 1980 and 2002 
 
We begin by examining the complete sample comprising US PE portfolio companies 
financed between 1980 and the end of 2002. The first panel of table 4 shows the 
descriptive statistics of PE investments and of benchmark investments in stocks. Each set 
represents one portfolio consisting of 642  investments that are completely comparable in 
terms of timing and cash inflow. On the one hand these are investments in PE portfolio 
companies and on the other hand in stocks. The mean return of PE investments shows an 
IRR of 36,49%. This in line with expectations, is more than three times higher than that of 
equal investments in stocks (11,59%). Besides higher mean returns, PE investments are 
characterized by higher cross section volatility. However, PE’s standard deviation of 
242% is only about twice as high as  that of stocks [103%]. The high returns of PE 
portfolios are generated on the whole by only a few high performing companies. In the 
case of PE, the sample therefore shows higher maximum returns and a wider range of 
investment performances (PE: 3026%/ stocks: 1943%). Figure 1 shows the typical IRR 
distribution of PE investments. In contrast to the benchmark, PE performance distribution 
is characterized by two peaks. This is the result of a high number of lost investments, a 
relatively low number of modestly performing investments, but a large number of well 
and some extremely well performing investments.
 35 
 
SAMPLE PERIOD – Investments between 1980 and 1990 
 
Reducing the sample to investments made between 1980 and 1990 we see 
deterioration in the performance of both PE and stocks. The mean return of PE is nearly 
zero and underperforms benchmark stocks. Analytically, this is the consequence of fewer 
extremely high performing PE investments. The maximum performance of PE 
investments made in the 1980s does not exceed an IRR of 642%. A median return of 
8.77%, however, exceeds the median benchmark return. This reflects, despite a large 
number of totally lost investments, the overall high figure for modestly performing PE 
investments. However, extremely well performing investments, which are able to 
compensate in terms of mean IRR for the huge amount of failures, on average does not 
remain. Within this period PE markets had not really been established. It was not until the 
1990s that an efficient and professional PE market was developed by  consultants with 
knowledge of M&A, by the establishment of new, well functioning and more liquid exit-
                                                 
35 This corresponds partly to the findings of Cochrane (2001),pp. 10. Analyzing only the returns to ipo or trade 
sale, he determines a few outstanding returns of thousands of percent and many relatively more modest returns.   13 
channels, and last but not least by the academic investigation of these topics, e.g. 
entrepreneurship. In the period between 1980 and 1990 the correlation between PE and 
the benchmark stocks’ performance is lower than that measured over the full sample 
period [-0,044]. 
 
SAMPLE PERIOD – Investments between 1990 and 2002 
   
Investments which were made in the last decade (vintage year 1990 to 2002) exhibit 
different characteristics. Our sample data reflects the well performing capital market 
movements of the 1990s. High performing PE investments, especially those realized 
during the bubble between 1996 and 2001, made it possible to reach a mean IRR of 
56.8%. The variation in PE investment performances (standard deviation 295%) increases 
as well. Even if the benchmark investments also show a relatively high performance of 
16.39%, PE outperforms the stock investments. In this period, the correlation between PE 
and stock investments also increases from -0.044 to -0.016. This matches the result of 
Longin and Solnik (1995), which demonstrate empirically the rise of a correlation 
between national stock markets in periods of high volatility.
36 Especially in the last years 
of the 20th century the return volatility of all asset markets was increasing.  
 
SAMPLE PERIOD – Realization date before and after January 1997 
 
We observe extraordinary returns in the last decade. One reason may be the booming 
years between the end of 1996 and 2001. In all probability there will be no similar 
recovery  in the near future that will raise performances to reach former absolute heights. 
Nevertheless, we have to ask whether PE in the future will still outperform stocks as a 
result of more developed PE markets, or whether the former outperformance of PE 
relative stocks was only the result of a larger bubble of PE markets compared to the stock 
markets. PE performance is largely determined by the condition of the exit markets. To 
test robustness we exclude from the overall sample all investments realized in the boom 
years after 1996. Table 4.1 panel 4 presents a drop in average PE return to 7.9%, but also 
shows a relatively high median return of 17.6%. The median return is higher than that of 
the benchmark investments. However, there is a greater degree of skewness to the left and 
maximum performances do not reach the same heights as the benchmark investments. 
Before 1997, PE seemed to be characterized by a constantly high number of modestly 
                                                 
36 See Longin / Solnik (1995), pp. 16.   14 
performing investments, together with fewer extremely well performing investments with 
4 digit IRRs. Even if there was a constant frequency of lost investments over time, in the 
early years the number of extremely well performing investments was too low - and the 
relative number of lost investments too high - to outperform the stock benchmark in terms 
of mean IRR. The high number of modestly performing investments could not compensate 
for the high number of lost investments. Investments which had been realized in the boom 
years after 1997 outperformed the benchmark in terms of mean and median IRR. The 
return outperformance was priced by a strong increase in return volatility. Further analysis 
will show to what extent this risk was diversifiable.  
To avoid selection bias we take note of all realized investments including those 
which were written off or lost. Nevertheless, there could be a potential for bias. Badly 
performing investments from previous years with no chance to exit may still be held by 
the fund and will dilute the overall fund's’ performance. Such company data are only 
partly considered by using complete investment information of all mature funds. To test 
for robustness we reduce the sample to those investments which are taken exclusively 
from realized, and in a second step from almost realized (at least 70% of funds’ 
investments are completely realized), funds (see table 4.1 panel 6, 7). Thus we integrate 
all investments made by the funds into the analysis and avoid potential selection bias. 
Results confirm the findings of the analyses which are made for investments realized 
before 1997. Most funds which started to invest in the late 1990s have not yet been 
completely realized and, therefore, their investments are not taken into account in this 
sample subset. The extremely high returns of the last few years are not recognized if we 
analyze this subset. Table 4.1 panel 7 describes investments taken from completely 
realized funds. Most funds which were raised in the late 1990s contain at least one non-
completely realized investment. Consequently, all investments done by those funds are 
excluded from the analysis. Consequently, the sample “Investments taken from fully 
realized funds” includes investments conducted mainly in the 1980s and very early 1990s. 
Funds which had been raised in this period are usually realized by today. As a result, the 
performance data are similar to those of the sample that describes investments from the 
1980s. We cannot, however, evaluate the exact performance of funds which have been 
raised in the late 90tis and are still not completely realized but have profited from the exit 
environment of the last years.  
 
SAMPLE PERIOD - Summary 
   15 
To summarize: it is only in the late 1990s that we observe private equity investments 
outperforming their public market investment equivalent. We do not know yet if this 
development is a result of a learning process or of improved market mechanisms, such as 
the establishment of better exit markets or the emergence of advisors, or whether it is 
merely due toly a temporary bubble. This will be an important factor which helps to 
decide the future development of the whole PE industry. If the overall industry does not 
function well, the individual skills of PE investment managers will be increasingly 
decisive as a factor for success. A market clearance of low quality PE managers will help 
to save the industry's reputation! Due to the large capital amounts in the market, which 
have to be allocated to private equity, it is however uncertain, whether a market clearance 
will be possible. The real world shows, that the institutional investment pressure forces 
non privileged market participants without invitation to A-funds to invest in B-funds. As a 
result, the overall performance will be still modest and could underperform the traditional 
markets. Today, private equity funds are again beginning to raise an expected overall 
amount of 60 billion US-dollars (expectations 2004) in venture capital that was sidelined 
after the Nasdaq plunged in 2000. Market experts argue, that again “we are seeing some 
effects of the overhang at play”.
37 Due to the high competition for the best deals, 
companies that definitely will not contribute to an extraordinary pe market 
outperformance are again financed as the way out of the capital overhang. 
 
INVESTMENT STAGES – Venture Capital vs. Buy Outs 
 
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics of sample subsets which represent investments 
in different financing stages. We observe strongly increased average returns for pure 
venture capital investments compared to all other private equity investments without VC, 
such as MBO/LBO and turnaround investments (all PE without venture capital = PE w/t 
VC). The PE w/t VC mean IRR does not exceed its benchmark by much. The higher mean 
return of venture capital is connected to a higher variation (313% versus 51%) of returns 
within a wider range of possible outcomes (max. performance of VC: 2962% versus PE 
w/t VC: 148%). Our results do not completely correspond to those of Ljungquist and 
Richardson (2003). They analyze performance at the fund level and derive an 
outperformance for funds with investment focus on buyouts (against venture capital).
38 
Although average returns in our sample are lower, the median return of PE w/t VC is 
                                                 
37 See  Francisco Bamby, Navigating a bounce in venture capital, CBS.MarketWatch.com, March 18 2004, pp.1 
38 See Ljungquist and Richardson (2003), pp.21; they observe an average return of 21.83 % for buyout funds 
versus 14.08 for venture funds.   16 
much higher than that of pure venture capital investments and of its benchmark. Venture 
capital receives high average returns owing only to some extremely well performing 
outliers (Figure 2). Due to the high number of lost investments (25.48%), the right 
company selection and the capital weightings are decisive for the overall outperformance 
of VC funds. Given equal weightings, we observe for venture capital investments an 
average return of 47.81%. The subsample PE w/t VC has a lot of modestly performing 
investments and an average IRR of 7.62%. The right portfolio composition is not as 
dependent on the manager's ability to choose highflyers. Furthermore, there is a big 
difference between the correlations of both PE categories compared to their benchmark 
stocks. In contrast to PE w/t VC, which has a high correlation of 0.25 to stock 
investments, VC is practically uncorrelated to the stock benchmark.  
Compared to the overall venture capital sample, purely early stage investments are 
characterized by a decreasing average outperformance (21.39% versus 37.12%) against 
the benchmark. The median return is even negative. This is the result of a very high 
frequency of lost investments (38%). Only a few extremely well-performing investments 
contribute to a high average return. Nevertheless, the overall sample's best performing 
investments are early stage investments. This leads to a wide range and high variation of 
investment returns. The portfolio manager's ability to select well-performing investments 
determines  the overall early stage-fund performance. The chance of selecting badly 
performing portfolio companies is high during early stage investing.   
 
INVESTMENT STAGES – Mezzanine vs. Non-Mezzanine 
 
Our final analysis is presented in panels 4 and 5 of table 4.2. We explore 
performance differences dividing the full sample into mezzanine-financed and non-
mezzanine-financed investments. We observe similar results as before. Mezzanine 
investments are characterized by a lower mean return outperformance (14.37% versus 
27.54%) against its benchmark, but a higher outperformance of median returns (22.43% 
versus 5.88%). The reason is similar to that of preceding explanations. Mezzanine 
investments are exposed to lower risk than the sample's other investments. Thus, we 
observe lower variation in returns within a smaller range of outcomes and a lower 
frequency of total lost investments (only 4%). 
5.  Effects of naive diversification when portfolio size is increased 
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In this section we explore the diversification benefits of PE portfolios with 
increasing size and compare them to those of benchmark portfolios that are composed of 
public market return equivalents. Owing to our available data with information down to 
the company level, for the first time it has become possible to construct own portfolios 
with varying size. We perform a bootstrap simulation of portfolios each including a 
certain number of investments. After deriving 5,000 bootstrap samples for each portfolio 
size, we then calculate cross-section variation over the samples’ outcomes. 
 
THE RISK – Frequency distribution of portfolio returns   
 
Figure 3 shows changes in standard deviation over the bootstrap portfolios when the 
portfolio size is increased. Figures 4 to 6 represent the frequency distributions of returns 
on funds consisting of different numbers of investments. As described in the preceding 
section, all PE investments exhibit higher performance dispersion and therefore higher 
absolute risk than their stock benchmark investments. Although there is a stronger 
diversification of absolute risk for PE portfolios compared to the stock portfolios, in this 
section, we observe similar relative naive diversification effects. The distribution of 
portfolio returns approaches normal distribution with increasing size. Since there is a 
relativly high rate of total lost investments within the private equity asset class, building 
portfolios decreases the risk of failure.  It is already the case with a portfolio consisting of 
only 5 PE investments that there is a almost zero per cent probability of total loss. The 
probability of negative absolute returns, however, is not decreasing – but increasing - 
before more than 5 investments are included in the portfolio (see table 5). This is not 
caused by the relatively high number of lost or negatively performing, but rather by the 
small number of extremely well performing investments. Portfolios have to reach a 
minimum size to increase the probability that at least one high performing investment is 
included. This is in accordance with the common assumptions made in the context of PE 
investment. Though we find similar decreases in the standard deviation of PE and stock 
portfolios with increasing size, table 5 shows some differences when the quartile 
distribution is analyzed for returns on both asset classes. Whilst we find a similar 
probability of negative returns (35.22% versus 30.35%), PE is characterized by a high 
number of investments that perform worse than minus fifty per cent. This is the result of 
many failing investments with an IRR of minus one hundred per cent. If we increase 
portfolio size, the number of PE portfolios performing worse than minus 50 per cent does 
not decrease as fast as the number of stock portfolios exposed to that worse performance.   18 
However, in all cases there is a higher number of negative performing stocks (<0%) than 
of PE portfolios. 
 
THE (NON-)DIVERSIFIABLE RISK – Standard deviation of portfolio returns 
 
In recent times new approaches to asset pricing, which deviate slightly from the 
traditional assumptions made by the CAPM, have been published. Malkiel/Xu (2000) or 
Jones/Rhodes-Kropf (2002) argue that in practice the assumption that investors can hold 
any combination of the market portfolio and risk free assets is often violated. They 
indicate that these so called constrained investors are unable to hold the market portfolio 
for reasons such as transaction costs, liquidity constraints or other exogenous factors.
39 
With respect to portfolio construction within the PE sector, a significant length of time is 
required to assess the deal flow and make investment decisions. The PE manager 
identifies only a small number of investments, which will be included in his certain 
portfolio. Furthermore, the investments are highly illiquid and transaction costs are 
excessively high. Jones/Rhodes-Kropf (2002) show that, dependent on the number of 
portfolio constituents, PE managers are exposed to changing, but real, levels of 
idiosyncratic risk. Because of their PE investment statute PE managers are constrained 
and unable to hold the market portfolio.
40 Frequently they are subject to investment 
restrictions which even relate to private investment. Therefore, even if the PE manager 
increases the portfolio size to an infinite number of private equity portfolio constituents, 
he still faces limited market non-diversifiable risk, the so-called “PE market” risk. With 
respect to the combination of asset classes, the “PE market” portfolio that is available to a 
constrained PE manager is less diversified than the market portfolio. In keeping with this 
assumption, the constrained stock manager holds the “stock-market” portfolio in case of 
full diversification (with respect to the number of stocks and their industries) occurring 
within his asset class.
41   
Increasing the overall number of portfolio constituents, we give empirical evidence 
of naive risk diversification down to the level of stock- or PE market risk.
42 Table 6 shows 
that the “PE market” risk exceeds the “stock-market” risk. This is in line with the 
hypothesis of Jones /Rhodes-Kropf (2002). We show empirically that the non-
                                                 
39 Malkiel, G.M./Xu,Y. (2000) 
40 For a discussion of investment statutes and restrictions see Feinendegen, S. / Schmidt, D.M. / Wahrenburg, M. 
(2002) and Schmidt, D.M. / Wahrenburg, M. (2003). 
41 See Malkiel/ Xu (2000), pp.2 ff. for general discussion 
42 See Jones /Rhodes-Kropf (2002), pp. 4   19 
diversifiable risk that a constrained PE investor has to hold exceeds that of stock investors 
as well as the market risk [this we show in the next section].  
Those PE portfolios where investments are realized after 1996 have an especially 
high non-diversifiable market risk of about 23.78%. In particular, we observe, for 
example, constrained-market risk levels for PE portfolios realized between 1980 and the 
end of 96 of about 6.1%, and for portfolios constructed after 1990, with realizations 
occurring mainly after 1996, of about 20.8%. Moreover, mezzanine portfolios have the 
lowest non-diversifiable risk (5%).  
It is consistent with these results that the diversifiable risk of PE portfolios exceeds 
that of stock portfolios (in absolute measures). The relative diversifiable risk, however, 
calculated as the ratio between diversifiable and full risk, shows small variations between 
the PE and benchmark portfolios. We obtain relative diversifiable risk levels that range 
between 92.2% and 94.8% of full risk. Nevertheless, it is apparent that portfolios 
consisting exclusively of mezzanine-financed companies have a lower relatively 
diversifiable risk than their benchmark portfolios. In contrast, all other private equity 
portfolios have slightly higher relatively diversifiable risk levels than their benchmark 
portfolios. For these private equity categories we observe that greater benefits are to be 
gained from increasing the portfolio size than is the case for stock or mezzanine 
portfolios.  
The empirical research described above exclusively investigates naive 
diversification effects of stock or real restate portfolios. A large number of papers have 
tried to answer the question how many investments are needed to obtain a well-diversified 
portfolio. Exploring the optimal portfolio size of private equity portfolios on an empirical 
basis is more complicated. Besides the fact that it is necessary to have access to data on 
single investments and not just on overall fund performances, there are other factors 
which are important with respect to determining the limits of portfolio size. In contrast to 
stocks or real estate portfolios, the management of each additional private equity 
investment is connected with an extraordinarily high degree of effort. Therefore, 
according to Statman (1987) optimal portfolio size is not only restricted by decreasing 
marginal risk diversification, but also by the increasing management effort or limited 
managing capacity involved. In addition to the restrictions by investment statute to 
investing in only one asset class, transaction costs are another reason why the investment-
manager is not able to hold optimally diversified portfolios.
43 Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 
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(2002) show empirically that this higher level of idiosyncratic risk, which the constrained 
PE investment manager has to face, is priced.
44 We show that there is also an idiosyncratic 
risk premium which a constrained PE investment manager has to hold even if he is fully 
diversified within his asset class. It exceeds the risk that has to be held by a constrained 
stock manager. The descriptive statistics of section 4, which describe the outperformance 
of private equity investments relative to benchmark stocks, do not always confirm a 
proper pricing of the higher idiosyncratic risk levels that PE managers have to hold owing 
to certain investment restrictions. Especially in the 1980s and the early 1990s the 
constrained PE investor did not receive any compensation for holding more risk. PE was 
underperforming the market. In recent years the higher level of idiosyncratic risk has been 
priced by the market. PE has outperformed stock investments. 
 
THE DIVERSIFIABLE RISK 
 
We find for all PE and stock portfolios at least a 90% diversifiable risk reduction for 
a portfolio comprising 50 investments. Tables 7 (1. and 2.) gives an overview of risk 
diversification effects with increasing portfolio size for sample subsets. On the basis of 
separate analysis with respect to the investment stage, we explore faster diversifiable risk 
reduction for portfolios consisting of investments from an earlier investment stage. Table 
7.2 displays the benefits from diversification with respect to investment stage. It indicates, 
for example, that for  a portfolio size of 50 investments there is a 94.31% diversifiable risk 
reduction for early stage portfolios or a 92.3% reduction for VC portfolios versus a 91.7% 
reduction for PE w/t VC portfolios. The benchmark stock portfolios do not exhibit these 
clear gradations but the process of change is similar. It is likely that the effects vary 
relative to the exactness of benchmark stock choice with respect to investment size. 
Portfolios containing “small size” investments seem to diversify risk faster. There is a 
stronger and faster diversification of company-specific risk when the portfolio size is 
increased. 
Almost complete diversifiable risk reduction is achieved by a portfolio size of 200 
investments. For a portfolio size of 200 we observe for both PE and benchmark stock 
portfolios a diversifiable risk reduction of at least 99.7%. However, if the initial portfolio 
size is 15 investments further marginal risk reduction is small when the portfolio size is 
raised. An inclusion of 15 investments reduces diversifiable risk of both PE and 
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benchmark portfolios already by about almost 80% (see table 7).
45 Again, for a portfolio 
size of 15 we find a diversifiable risk reduction of at least somewhere in the region of 
78.4%. In the real world, as noted in section 2., we observe an average portfolio size that 
is between 20 and 28 investments. In this respect  portfolio managers would appear to be 
able to find the balance between risk diversification and portfolio management 
expenditure.  
We observed different diversifiable risk reduction effects by analyzing certain 
private equity categories. Comparing the level of diversifiable risk reduction with 
increasing size of PE and benchmark stock portfolios, we also detect differences within 
each subsample category. To test for differences in diversifiable risk reduction, we 
orientate our analysis on that of Kuhle (1987) or Kuhle and Moorehead (1989) with 
respect to methodology. We use the Z-test to determine the statistical difference between 
the mean value of PE’s diversifiable risk reduction level and that of its benchmark. The 
null hypothesis of “no difference in diversifiable risk reduction level between PE and the 
benchmark stock portfolios with increasing portfolio size” is rejected for all subsamples at 
a 1% level of significance. Table 7 presents the respective z-values with 
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i i y x (x = diversifiable risk reduction level of PE portfolios at size-step i; 
y = diversifiable risk reduction level of benchmark portfolio at size-step i; i=1,2…8 for 
portfolio size =2,5….200 ). The results indicate slower diversifiable risk reduction for 
later stage private equity portfolios (subsamples PE w/t VC and mezzanine with negative 
z-values) than is observed for their benchmark portfolios. On the contrary, there is a faster 
reduction of diversifiable risk when portfolios that exclusively contain venture capital 
investments (subsamples ‘VC’, ‘early stage VC’ and ‘Full sample w/t Mezzanine’ [here 
overweight of vc investments in sample] with positive z-values) are increased compared 
to the benchmark portfolios. This is in line with previous results. Portfolios composed of 
small sized investments are characterized by a fast reduction of diversifiable risk. 
In addition to the differences presented here in diversification effects between PE 
portfolios with different compositions, this analysis clearly shows the difficulties involved 
in using small cap stocks as a private equity proxy. It is too simple and too inexact to 
proxy for private equity by using small caps. In the next section we investigate optimal 
asset allocations for mixed PE and stock portfolios and we pick up a topic that starting 
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with Merrill Lynch (1995) has always been simplified by using small caps to proxy for 
PE. Despite the existence of some methodological hurdles, we use original private equity 
IRR data with correct benchmark IRRs in order to revise former empirical findings. 
6.  Optimal asset allocation 
 
According to Jones /Rhodes-Kropf constrained investors have to hold an 
idiosyncratic risk premium because of investment restrictions and limited management 
capacity. In this section, we try to find optimal portfolio compositions from the view of 
non-constrained investors and determine unconstrained market risks.
46 Following the 
methodology described in the appendix, we simulate mixed asset portfolios to determine 
the optimal portfolio allocation to stocks and private equity. Using data of different 
samples’ subsets we show results on the basis of historical data and increased 
transparency and we try to give recommendations for future allocations.   
By way of illustration, figure 7 presents risk return characteristics of portfolios with 
a portfolio size of 20 investments and changing private equity allocations. Each line 
represents the efficient frontier of portfolios built from private equity and stock 
investments from different sample subsets. With respect to the individual risk/return 
preferences, investments in different asset categories with different allocations make 
sense. The unconstrained investor is able to reduce risk below the level of sole “stock-“ or 
“PE market” risk by combining both assets. The asset classes’ return and risk differences 
and their correlations affects the optimal portfolio weighting of private equity. If we 
include private equity investments taken from the full sample, from the pure VC sample or 
from the full sample w/t mezzanine we find similar efficient frontier lines. Mixed 
portfolios built between 1990 and 2002 show the highest returns, portfolios with an 
investment period between 1980 and 1990 exhibit the worst performance characteristics. 
This is in keeping with the results of section 4. An allocation to mezzanine investments 
increases portfolio returns with moderate risk bearing.    
 
THE MINIMUM VARIANCE PORTFOLIO 
 
Determining minimum variance portfolios, table 8 shows according to the PE 
sample used that the optimal weighting of private equity lies between 3% and 46% of 
                                                                                                                                                          
(1984) with respect to real estate. 
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portfolio investments.
47 We reveal for portfolios that are built with randomly chosen 
private equity investments out of the overall sample an optimal allocation to private equity 
of about 15%. Increasing the overall portfolio size from 1 to 200 investments leads, we 
find, to slight changes in optimal allocation to private equity and an enormous decrease in 
portfolio risk. Figure 9 shows efficient frontiers and diversification effects when portfolio 
size is increased. By way of an example, we find that an addition of 5 private equity 
investments to an existing portfolio that already contains 5 investments would reduce 
cross-section standard deviation by about 34%. An addition of 5 stocks, however, would 
reduce the risk level by about 68%, and an optimal allocation to PE and stocks even would 
reduce risk by about 78%.   
The optimal portfolio weighting of private equity in order to achieve minimum 
variance compositions is mainly determined by the relation of private equity and stock 
portfolio standard deviations and their correlation. Although there is a relatively high 
correlation of 0.25 between PE w/t VC and the benchmark stocks, we find that the highest 
allocation of about 46% to that category gives rise to the minimum variance portfolio. 
This is caused by the relatively small return volatility of later staged private equity. If we 
investigate private equity samples consisting of other investments - those made between 
the years 1980 until 1990, realized up until 1996, with mezzanine-financed investments, 
or samples of funds that are realized up to 70 per cent - we find that it is optimal to 
allocate between 28% and 43% to private equity in order to minimize volatility. Due to 
the extremely high return volatility of pure VC or early stage investments compared to 
their benchmarks, no more than a small allocation (down to 3%) to those investments 
should be made.  
In all cases it is advantageous to include private equity in mixed portfolios. As 
shown in figure 8, the mixed asset risk is smaller than the constrained market risks of 
stocks or PE. The differences between the mixed asset market risk (as shown in table 8 
last column) and the constrained market risks where the investor is restricted to investing 
in stocks or PE (as shown in table 6 each second line), is that part of idiosyncratic risk that 
the investor has to hold because of his investment restriction. The constrained investor has 
to hold a higher share of idiosyncratic risk. 
 
THE MAXIMUM RETURN/RISK-RATIO-PORTFOLIO 
                                                 
47 Due to equally weighted amounts of invested capital in every single company it is inconsequential whether 
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To determine optimal portfolio compositions, we measure further risk return 
characteristics by calculating a performance ratio. With respect to the methodology we 
follow Kuhle (1987) and interpret the portfolio quality according to the ratio of average 
return and cross section standard deviation over the portfolio's investments. This 
performance ratio is similar to the well-known Sharpe ratio. Utilizing this measure we 
determine different optimal portfolio weights ranging between 5% and 65% (table 9). 
Under the premise of maximizing performance ratios, the relation of overreturn to 
overvolatility (compared to its benchmark stock portfolios) is that factor which determines 
the optimal PE/stock proportions in the portfolio. Apart from two subsets, in our sample 
all private equity portfolios compared to their respective benchmark show a level of 
excess return which is relatively higher than that of excess volatility. As a result, portfolio 
compositions which maximize performance ratios call for high PE allocations. Table 9 
presents optimal portfolio weightings of private equity for maximizing performance ratios. 
All PE portfolios, except those formed with investments from the subset “Vintage year 
1980-90”, are composed optimally with weightings between 27% and 65%. Portfolio 
weightings are higher than those which would have been optimal for minimizing 
investment return volatility. By way of an example, if we analyze the complete sample, 
figure 10 shows the course of changing performance ratios when PE weightings are 
increased. The asset compositions of minimum variance portfolios do not correspond to 
those with maximum performance ratios. The peak with a maximum performance ratio is 
reached by allocating about 35% to private equity. In particular, starting without any 
allocation to PE the performance ratio is increased by 68% when we allocate 35% to 
private equity. Figure 11 shows these changes of performance ratios on a log scale. 
Furthermore, the figure illustrates that it is preferable to invest exclusively in private 
equity – which is diversified within its asset class- than exclusively in benchmark stocks.  
If portfolios are evaluated on the basis of performance ratios, a portfolio allocation 
to mezzanine investments produces the best results (performance ratio between 35% and 
486% according to portfolio size, table 9.2). On the grounds of the excellent return-risk 
ratios expressed by the empirical data, this analysis recommends that mezzanine portfolio 
weightings be increased up to 65%.  
PE investments made between 1980 and 1990, or realized between 1980 and 1996, 
exhibit worse return risk characteristics. They are characterized by smaller returns and 
higher risks than their benchmark stocks. With respect to maximum performance ratios,   25 
our portfolio simulation suggests smaller optimal PE weightings than were recommended 
in order to obtain minimum variance portfolios.   
 
THE PORTFOLIO SIZE AND THE OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION 
 
Mainly with respect to ‘minimum variance portfolio’ but also to ‘maximum 
performance ratio portfolio’ measures, we find that the optimal PE portfolio weightings 
change with increasing portfolio size (table 8 and 9 lines “weights”). Owing to slightly 
different relative levels of maximum diversifiable risk between PE and stocks (table 6, 
each 3. line), there are different levels of PE and stock volatility with progressive portfolio 
size increases (table 7). When constructing mixed asset portfolios, the changing extent of 
risk diversification of PE compared to stock portfolios with increasing size influences the 
optimal allocation to private equity. With increasing portfolio size the optimal weight of 
private equity rises if PE portfolios expel a higher relative share of diversifiable risk. This 
is illustrated in table 6, panel “Only VC”, which presents a relation between the full risk 
of VC and stocks of about 349.66 %. When the portfolio size of both portfolios is 
increased to 200 investments we find a proportion between the PE and stock portfolios’ 
non-diversifiable risk of about 287% (table 6, column 6). We find a higher relative ratio of 
diversifiable to full risk for pure VC portfolios than for the benchmark stock portfolios. 
Therefore, both diversifiable risk and absolute risk diversification effects are higher with 
increasing portfolio size. Owing to these larger risk diversification benefits of certain PE 
portfolios with increasing size, it is preferable to increase the allocation to PE with 
increasing portfolio size. In tables 8.2 and 9.2 the panel “only VC” shows that the optimal 
portfolio weighting of VC increases from 6% to 11% and from 27% to 34%, respectively, 
with increasing mixed portfolio size - between 1 and 200 investments. On the other hand, 
we find a tendency for decreasing PE optimal weightings in mixed portfolios, if there is a 
smaller diversifiable risk level for the PE subset compared to its benchmark (e.g. subset 
“mezzanine”, table 8.2). These findings correspond exactly to those of Brown (1997) and 
Brown and Schuck (1996). On the one hand, they find relatively higher  non-systematic 
risk levels of real estate compared to stock portfolios. On the other hand, when the size of 
mixed stock and real estate portfolios is increased they establish higher allocations to real 
estate with respect to optimizing risk/return characteristics.  
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7.  Extensions 
 
a.  Net performances 
 
As mentioned above, when determining portfolio characteristics we do not take into 
account any management fee. The difference between fixed annual fees concerning the 
management of private equity or stock portfolios is not so essential that it would cause the 
results to be biased to any significant extent. The carried interest payments, however, will 
change the performance levels of private equity portfolios. To test for variation in returns, 
we calculate net IRRs for the full sample. This calculation suffers from two major 
problems: First, the level of carried interest payments is not completely standardized.
48 
Furthermore the calculation method is highly varying between the fund managers (e.g. 
deal by deal or carry payments after full funds capital repayment). Second, there are 
difficulties in simulating carried interest payments, which in reality are charged on the 
overall fund's pooled cash flow series. In this analysis, we calculate net IRRs utilization 
derived on the basis of deal-by-deal carry calculation. We determine net IRR distributions 
at the company level by subtracting a 20% carried interest on the capital gains of each 
single company after 100% distribution of capital which was invested in this company. 
Usually, the carried interest is calculated on the fund's cumulated companies’ cash flows. 
Deal by deal carry payments are only seldomly negotiated, if the fund manager's 
bargaining power is extremely high. Hence, our results are absolutely worst case scenarios 
in the sense of investors’ return. In reality, negative performing investments with long 
lasting negative cash flows delay the overall funds’ distributions and therefore the need to 
pay carried interest. On the basis of a portfolio simulation including individual i.i.d. 
distributed company returns we cannot take this fact into account. We calculate carried 
interest payments considering the individual cash flow time series of each portfolio 
company separately. Thus, we calculate portfolio descriptive statistics using each single 
investment’s net IRR. Utilizing this deal-by-deal carry calculation, we neglect the fact that 
negative cash flows of investments with negative IRRs are reducing the fund's overall 
capital gains and therefore the amount of carried interest payments on fund basis.  
Because of these difficulties while measuring net real IRRs, we only present these as 
an extension in table 10. We preferred to make former calculations on the basis of gross 
cash flows instead of taking into account distortions as a result of wrongly calculated 
carried interest charges. In any event, table 10 presents net IRRs of the sample “vintage   27 
year 1980-2002”. Average IRRs decrease by around 30% , median IRRs only by around 
16%. The greater decrease of mean IRRs is caused by a larger absolute cut of extremely 
high capital gains and the problems discussed before. Performance characteristics will not 
change hardly since the standard deviation also decreases by around 18%.  
Since it is less the intention of this paper to give a precise account of previous 
returns than it is to study the effects of a combination of asset classes, we base our 
analysis on measures of real gross returns.To test for robustness we repeat calculations 
using the PE net returns. Table 11 shows optimal weightings of private equity with respect 
to minimizing the portfolio variance. Because of the smaller deviations of private equity 
portfolio returns, when performing calculations on the basis of net performances, it is 
recommended  that a slightly increased share be allocated to private equity (from 16% to 
20%). Portfolio volatility and the returns of minimal variance portfolios correspond 
exactly to those derived on the basis of gross performance parameters. Moreover, the 
market risk of fully diversified portfolios - diversified that is in terms of the number of 
portfolio constituents, not the number of asset classes - corresponds to that which was 
calculated previously. In revealing maximum performance ratios we find economically 
similar values and the optimal private equity portfolio weightings with respect to 
maximizing performance ratios also do not differ from former values.  
The fact that similar results are obtained when using net (simulated) or gross 
performance parameters furthermore justifies the use of gross values in order to determine 
the characteristics and dynamics of private equity and mixed asset portfolios.   
b.  Alternative performance measurements 
 
    Although the internal rate of return represents the standard performance measure 
for private equity investments and is even recommended by the EVCA, it is associated 
with some shortcomings with respect to evaluating the investment return. On the whole, 
when calculating the IRR the reinvestment rate of distributed capital and the investment 
rate of unbounded capital are assumed to correspond to the internal rate of return. Return 
parameters tend to adopt extreme values. On the one hand, extremely well performing 
investments expel very high IRRs owing to a reinvestment assumption with high project 
rates. On the other hand, an implicated low reinvestment rate decreases overall IRR of 
badly performing investments. To test robustness we investigate private equity and 
benchmark stock returns following Kallberg, Lui and Greig (1996) by calculating the 
                                                                                                                                                         
48 See Gompers/Lerner (1996) for the US and Schmidt/Wahrenburg (2003) for Europe   28 
modified IRR (MIRR) with an assumed unbounded capital market-reinvestment rate of 
5%. Table 12 presents MIRR descriptive statistics. We obtain more moderate average 
return measures of about 14.37% and 4.26% for private equity and stocks, respectively. 
Due to an on average lower reinvestment rate, maximum returns decrease to 1409% and 
21.7% for private equity and benchmark stocks, respectively. Besides lower return 
parameters, we indicate similar relative outperformances for private equity against its 
benchmark. Relative outperformance of about 237% based on MIRR calculation is even 
slightly higher than that based on common IRR calculation (214%). Due to these similar 
ratios we do not expect any strong variations in the results of the analysis carried out in 
section 6 and 7 where calculations were performed with the IRR as the return measure. 
However, whilst indicating these differences in performance parameters describing the 
same investments, we are also aware of the importance of comparing benchmark returns 
on the basis of the same return measurement.              
8.  Summary 
 
In this paper we investigate risk and return aspects of private equity investments. 
Our analysis is based on a representative sample of 642 US-American private equity 
portfolio companies with exact cash flow information. Information about the amount and 
date of all cash flows to and from the PE investments enables a cash flow equivalent and 
simultaneous investment in benchmark stocks. Thus, for every PE investment we observe 
an exact benchmark performance. By applying bootstrap simulations we observe risk-
return characteristics of portfolios with changing constituents.  
In analyzing the different subsets of private equity, we find higher performance 
variation within earlier stage categories. The pure venture capital sample is characterized 
not only by extremely well performing investments, but also by a high rate of lost 
investments. In addition to a higher average performance of venture capital portfolios, 
managing these portfolios requires skilful investment selection. High portfolio 
performance depends on the ability to pick high performing outliers. Later stage private 
equity, like MBO/LBOs or mezzanine investments, are distinguished by smaller 
performance variations and lost rates. With respect to these portfolios, we observe smaller 
average but higher median returns. It is easier to select investments with moderate 
performance.  
Time series analysis shows that it was only in the late 1990s that the overall private 
equity market was performing extremely well in terms of mean IRR. In the late 20th   29 
century
 we find a dramatic increase in the extent to which private equity outperforms 
stock investment. In earlier years private equity was underperforming its stock 
benchmarks. Future studies have to determine whether this development is the result of a 
learning process or of improved market mechanisms such as the establishment of better 
exit markets or the emergence of advisors, or simply due to a  temporary bubble. Findings 
on these topics will be an important factor in determining the future development of the 
whole PE industry. If the overall industry does not function well, the individual skills of 
the PE investment manager will play an increasingly decisive role. A market clearance of 
low quality PE managers is with respect to the large capital in the market, which has to be 
allocated to pe, not a realistic assumption, but would help to save the industry's reputation! 
In a special scenario we assume that a PE or a stock portfolio manager is 
constrained by his statute from holding all security classes. Constrained portfolios 
consisting of at least 200 investments have a bearing on “PE“ or “stock-market” risk. We 
show empirically that the non-diversifiable risk which a constrained PE investor has to 
hold exceeds that of stock investors by between 6% and 517%. Following the new 
approaches of Jones/Rhodes-Kropf (2003), we interpret this as some measure of the 
idiosyncratic risk premium of private equity portfolios.  
For PE and stock portfolios almost 80% of diversifiable risk is reduced when the 
portfolio size is increased to 15 investments. In fact, we and other authors observe the real 
world average PE portfolio size to be somewhere between 20 and 28 investments. With 
respect to portfolio size, portfolio managers seem to be able to find the balance between 
risk diversification and portfolio management expenditure.  
In a second scenario we reveal optimal portfolio compositions from the view of 
unconstrained investors by simulating mixed-asset portfolios. With respect to both the 
‘minimum variance’ and ‘maximum performance ratio’ measures a mixed asset portfolio 
allocation to private equity proves to be advantageous. The unconstrained investor is able 
to reduce risk below the level of sole “stock-“or “PE market” risk by combining both asset 
classes. With reference to the private equity sample used, we establish via bootstrap 
simulation optimal mixed-asset portfolio weightings of private equity to be between 3% 
and 65%. With a recommended portfolio weighting of 65%, mezzanine investments are 
best suited to optimizing mixed asset portfolios with respect to the received performance 
ratio.   30 
 In two scenarios the results reveal the necessity of choosing suitable investment 
categories, selecting well-performing investments, and finding the right proportions in 
mixed asset portfolios.  
     
    
      31 
 
References 
 
Bader (1996): Private Equity als Anlagekategorie: Theorie, Praxis und 
Portfoliomanagement für institutionelle Investoren, Bern. 
Barber, B.M. / Lyon, J.D. (1997): Detecting long-run abnormal stock return: The 
empirical power and specification of tests statistics, Journal of Financial Economics 
43, pp. 341-372. 
Brinson, G.P. / Diermeier, J.J. / Schlarbaum, G.G. (1986): A Composite Portfolio 
Benchmark for Pension Plans, The Financial Analyst Journal, Vol. 42, No. 2 pp. 15-
24. 
Brown, G.R. (1997): Reducing the Dispersion of Return in UK Real Estate Portfolios, The 
Journal of Real estate Portfolio Management, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 129-140. 
Brown, G.R. / Schuck, E.J. (1996): Optimal Portfolio Allocation to Real Estate Portfolios, 
The Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 63-73. 
Burgel, O. (1998): UK Venture Capital and Private Equity as an Asset Class for 
Institutional Investors, Research Report Foundation for Entrepreneurial Management, 
London Business School. 
Byrne, P.J. / Lee, S.L. (1999): Portfolio Size and the Risk Reduction of Dispersion: The 
Case of the United Kingdom Commercial Real Estate Market. A paper given at the 
Joint Conference of the Areuea and the asian real estate society. 
Byrne, P.J. / Lee, S.L. (2000): Risk Rduction and Real Estate Portfolio Size. A paper 
presented at the sixth PRRES Conference Sydney, Australia. 
Byrne, P.J. / Lee, S.L. (2001): The Relationship between Size, Diversification and Risk, 
Working Paper, University of Reading. 
Chen, P. / Baierl, G.T. / Kaplan, P.D. (2002): Venture Capital and its Role in Strategic 
Asset Allocation: Long Term Risk-Return Characteristics, The Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 83-89.    
Cochrane (2003): The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, NBER Working Paper No. 
8066. 
Cumming (2001): The Determinants of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical 
Evidence, Working Paper, University of Alberta. 
Efron B and Tibshirani R (1993): An Introduction to Bootstrap. New York, Chapman and 
Hall 
Elton, E.J. / Gruber, M.J (1977): Risk Reduction and Portfolio Size: An Analytical 
Solution, The Journal of Business, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 415-437. 
Ennis R.M. / Burik, P. (1991), Pension Fund Real Estate Investment Under simple 
Equilibrium Pricing Model, The Financial Analyst Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, S. 20-30. 
Evans, J.L. / Archner, S.H. (1968): Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion: An 
Empirical Analysis, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 761-767. 
Ehrhardt, O. / Koerstein, R. (2001): The Benchmark effect in long-run event studies, OR 
Spectrum 23, pp. 445-475.   32 
Feinendegen, S. / Schmidt, D.M. / Wahrenburg, M. (2002): Die Vertragsbeziehungen 
zwischen Investoren und Venture Capital Fonds: Eine empirische Untersuchung des 
europäischen Venture Capital Markt, CFS Working Paper, No. 2002/1 
Fischer, L. / Lorie, J.H. (1970): Some Studies of Variability of Returns on Investments in 
Common Stocks, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Staff Studies 
No. 168. 
Gompers, P./ Lerner, J (1999), An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital 
Partnership, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, pp. 3-44. 
 
Grissom, T.V. / Kuhle, J.L. / Walther, C.H. (1987): Diversification Works in Real Estate, 
too, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 4, pp. 231-248.  
Hellevik, J.S. / Hermann, R. (1996): Naive Diversifikation am deutschen Aktienmarkt: 
Eine empirische Retrospektive, Diskussionspapier Nr. 193, Universität Karlsruhe. 
Jones, M.C. /Rhodes-Kropf, M. (2002): The price of diversifiable risk in venture capital 
and private equity, Working Paper Columbia University 
J.P.Morgan/Reuters (1996): Risk Metrics – Technical Document, Fourth Edition, New 
York 
Kallberg, J.G. / Liu, C.H. / Greig, D.W. (1996): The role of Real Estate in the Portfolio 
Allocation Process, Real Estate Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 359-377. 
Kanniainen, V. / Keuschnigg, C. (2000): The Optimal Portfolio of Start Up-Firms in 
Venture Capital Finance, CESifo Working Paper No. 381. 
Kuhle, J.L. (1987): Portfolio Diversification and Return Benefits – CommonStock vs. 
Real Estate investment Trusts (REITS), The Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, pp. 1-9.  
Kuhle, J.L. / Moorehead, J.D. (1989): Applying the Bootstrap Technique to Real Estate 
Appraisal: An Empirical Analysis, The Journal of Real Estate Research Vol. 5 No. 1, 
pp. 33-40. 
Liang, Y. / Myer, R.C. / Webb, J.R. (1996): The Bootstrap Efficient Frontier for Mixed-
Asset Portfolios. Real Estate Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 247-256. 
Ljungquist and Richardson (2003): The Cash Flow, Return and Risk characteristics of 
private equity, Working Paper 9454 National Bureau of Economical Research, 
January 2003. 
Longin, F. / Solnik, B (1995): Is the correlation in international equity returns constant: 
1960-1990?, Journal of international Money and Finance, Vol 14, No. 1, pp. 3-27.  
Malkiel, B.G. / Xu, Y. (2000): Idiosyncratic risk and security returns, Working Paper 
University of Princeton and University of Texas. 
McFall  L., R. / Ghaleb-Harter, T.E. (2001): Private Equity as an Asset Class: Its Role in 
Investment Portfolios, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 77-91. 
Merrill Lynch, "The Paradox of Private Equity Investing: Information or Diversification?" 
in Quantitative Viewpoint (July 12, 1995) 
Miles, M. / McCue, T. (1984), Diversification in the Real Estate Portfolio, The Journal of 
Financial Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 57-68. 
Newbould, G.D. / Poon, P.S. (1993): The Minimum Number of Stocks Needed for 
Diversification, Financial Practice and Education, Vol. 3, pp. 85-87.   33 
Pradhuman, S. / Kan, W. / Chbani, M. (2001): Private Equity Insights, Asset Allocation: 
A Framework for Private Equity, Merrill Lynch & Co, Global Securities Reserach & 
Economics Group. 
Poon, S. / Taylor, S.J. / Ward, C.W. (1992): Portfolio Diversification: A Pictorial Analysis 
of the UK Stock Market, The Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 19, No. 
1, pp. 87-101.  
Quigley, J. M. / Woodward, S.E. (2002): Private Equity before the Crash: Estimation of 
an Index, Working Paper, University of California. 
Reid, G.C. / Terry, N.G. / Smith, J.A. (1997): Risk Management in Venture-Capital 
Organizations, The European Journal of Finance, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 27-47. 
Schmidt, D. / Wahrenburg, M. (2003): Contractual relations between European VC Funds 
and investors: The impact of Bargaining power and reputation on contractual design. 
CFS Working Paper, No. 2003/15. 
Statman (1987), M (1987): How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio? Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 5-11. 
Tole, T. (1982): You Can’t Diversify without Diversifying, The Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Vol. 8, No. 2, S.5-11. 
Vassal, V. De (2001): Risk Diversification Benefits of Multiple Stock Portfolios: Holding 
between one and one hundred stocks, Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 27, 
No.2, pp. 32-39. 
Webb, J.R. / Rubens, J.H. (1987): How Much in Real Estate? A surprising answer, The 
Journal of Portfolio Management, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 10-14. 
Webb, J.R. / Curcio, R.J. / Rubens, J.H. (1988): Diversification Gains from Oncluding 
Real Estate in Mixed-Asset portfolios. Decision Sciences, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 434-452. 
Ziobrowski, B.J. / Ziobrowski, A. J. (1997): Higher Real Estate Risk and Mixed-Asset 
Portfolio Performance, The Journal of Real Estate portfolio Management, Vol. 3, No. 
2, pp. 107-115 
 Ziobrowski, B.J. / Cheng, P. / Ziobrowski, A. J. (1997): Using a Bootstrap to Measure 
Optimum Mixed- Asset Portfolio Compositions: A Comment, Real Estate Economics, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 695-705. 
 
 
   34 
 Tables 
Table 1 – Origin 
This table shows the origin of complete samples’ investment manager and portfolio companies [in number of 
investment manager or companies]. The investment managers are located exclusively in Europe and the US. 
 
 Investment  Manager  Company 
North America  18  1694 
South America    16 
Europe 19  1339 
Asia    101 
No statement    470 
 
 
Table 2 – Performance comparison of complete and reduced samples 
The mean performance comparison between the complete and the reduced sample does not show any significant 
deviations. The reduced sample includes all US-American fully-realized investments [in percent of the whole 
sample]. 
 
  
Complete Sample 
[only realized 
investments]  Reduced Sample 
mean IRR  36.71%  36.49% 
Variance 7.26  5.83 
sample size  1539  642 
degrees of 
freedom  1330   
t-value 0.018607    
 
 
Table 3 – Sample description 
This table presents the sample description of both the complete sample consisting of 3619 world-wide private 
equity investments and the reduced sample consisting of 642 US-American investments 
 
Sample Description 
Industry Technology 
Health 
Care 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
& Services 
Materials & 
Processing Other  Energy 
Financial 
Services  Others 
Reduced 
sample  40.44% 14.73%  9.87%  12.23% 2.19%  2.04%  18.50% 
Complete 
sample 39.55%  15.9%  8.67% 11.08%  1.93%  2.09%  20.78% 
 Private  Equity 
 venture  Capital         
Investment 
stage Early  Expansion  Later Recapitalization  MBO/MBI/LBO 
Acquisition 
Financing 
Reduced 
sample  39.01% 20.25%  17.28%  6.17% 11.85%  5.43%   
Complete 
sample 38.77%  16.10%  13.15% 3.71%  24.20%  4.07%   
Number of financing rounds [reduced sample]    2114    
Proportion of mezzanine-financed investments [reduced. sample]  19.50%    
Volume of invested capital [reduced sample]    $4,101,649,064      35 
Table 4.1 – Descriptive Statistics [time periods] 
This table shows the descriptive IRR statistics of the samples’ private equity (PE) and the stock benchmark investment returns according to their investment date. Each panel describes 
the return characteristics for the individual sub-sample. Each private equity investment return is allocated to one completely comparable stock investment return.   
Sample 
Vintage Years 1980-02 
(Full sample)  Vintage Years 1980-90  Vintage Years 1990-02 
Realized before the end 
of 96  Realized after 96 
Investments taken from 
funds, which are up to 
70% realized 
Investments taken 
from fully-realized 
funds  
     PE  Stocks  PE  Stocks  PE  Stocks  PE  Stocks  PE Stock  PE Stocks Pe Stocks 
                  
Mean IRR  36,49%  11,59%  0,03%  3,39%  57,82%  16,39%  7,89%  9,80%  59,05%  12,90%  6,11%  5,47%  2,82%  6,38% 
Median IRR  14,55%  2,74%  8,77%  1,90%  22,18%  3,41%  17,60%  3,84%  12,94%  1,71%  13,14%  2,81%  13,40%  0,39% 
Modus -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  0  -1  -1  -1  0  -1  -1  -1  -1 
St. Deviation  2,42  1,03  0,85  0,59  2,95  1,21  0,87  0,71  3,11  1,22  0,78  0,55  0,84  0,72 
Variance 5,83  1,05  0,72  0,35  8,71  1,46  0,75  0,51  9,68  1,48  0,61  0,31  0,71  0,52 
Kurtosis 74,20  176,85  15,83  98,79  50,28  141,19  11,48  48,82  45,36  155,15  13,60  80,80  22,88  65,92 
Skewness 7,55  11,42  2,61  8,27  6,34  10,46  2,06  5,83  6,06  11,31  2,18  6,89  3,36  7,10 
Range 3062%  1943%  748%  831%  3062%  1943%  748%  831%  3061,53%  1942,59%  748%  831%  748,13%  830,85% 
Minimum IRR -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00% 
Maximum IRR  2961,53%  1842,59%  648,13%  730,85%  2961,53%  1842,59%  648,13%  730,85%  2961,53%  1842,59%  648,13%  730,85%  648,13%  730,85% 
Frequency of 
total lost  19,16%  0,78%  21,10%  0,84%  18,02%  0,007%  20,28%  0,01%  18,28%  0,55%  15,90%  0,007%  17,07%  0,61% 
Sample size  642  642  237  237  405  405  280  280  361  361  396  396  164  164 
Correlation -0,011  -0,0446008 -0,01609108 -0,04739192 -0,00840265  -0,00855593  -0,11878351 
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Table 4.2 – Descriptive Statistics [investment stage] 
This table shows the descriptive IRR statistics of the samples’ private equity (PE) and the stock benchmark investment returns according to their investment stage. Each panel describes 
the return characteristics for the individual sub-sample. Each private equity investment return is allocated to one completely comparable stock investment return.   
Sample  Private Equity w/t VC  Venture Capital only  Early Stage investments  Mezzanine 
Full sample w/t 
Mezzanine 
   PE  Stocks  PE  Stocks  PE  Stocks PE  Stocks  PE Stocks 
                
Mean IRR  7,62%  6,90%  47,81%  10,69%  22,57%  1,18%  22,47%  8,10%  40,03%  12,49% 
Median IRR  22,56%  2,73%  8,70%  1,96%  -27,83%  0,63%  25,16%  2,73%  8,77%  2,89% 
Modus -0,99  #NV -1  0  -1  -1  -1  #NV -1  0 
St. Deviation  0,51  0,42  3,13  0,92  3,14  0,49  0,72  0,54  2,67  1,11 
Variance 0,26  0,17  9,79  0,84  9,86  0,24  0,51  0,29  7,13  1,24 
Kurtosis 0,85  4,49  51,12  59,98  53,58  11,93  7,54  15,85  60,97  158,06 
skewness -0,23  1,28  6,52  6,80  6,67  2,19  1,69  2,62  6,90  11,03 
Range 249%  276%  3062%  1091%  3062%  390%  458%  468%  3062%  1943% 
Minimum IRR -100,00%  -89,96%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00%  -100,00% 
Maximum IRR  148,78%  185,55%  2961,53%  991,27%  2961,53%  290,09%  357,75%  367,70%  2961,53%  1842,59% 
Frequency of 
total lost  0,042%  0%  25,48%  0,012%  38,61  1,9%  4%  0,8%  22,24%  0,58% 
Sample size  71  71  310  310  158  158  125  125  517  517 
Correlation 0,25541717  0,00630298  -0,00651703  0,048  -0,0128108 
percentage 
realized until 
1996 28,16%   60,60%   53,06%         
percentage 
invested 
since 1996  28,16%   24,74%   25,85%         
percentage 
realized 
since 1996  71,83%   73,53%   70,88%           37 
Table 5 – Deciles performance frequency distribution 
Frequency distribution of the bootstrap portfolios’ returns (bootstrap sample = 5000). Bootstrap-Portfolios represented here have different sizes N=1,5,20,200. Stock portfolios correspond to the private equity portfolios with 
respect to both the characteristics of included stocks like industry and capitalization and to the timing of benchmark investment simulation. The panel IRR Class represents the deciles of the simulated portfolio return. 
  N=1      N=5       N=20       N=200       
  Private Equity  Stocks    Private Equity  Stocks    Private Equity  Stocks    Private Equity  Stocks   
IRR 
class  Frequency  Cumulated%  Frequency  Cumulated%  Frequency  Cumulated%  Frequency  Cumulated% Frequency  Cumulated%  Frequency 
Cumu 
lated%  Frequency 
Cumul 
ated%  Frequ. 
Cumu 
lated% 
-100%  922  18,44%  32  ,64%  2  ,04%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-90%  129  21,02%  39  1,42%  2  ,08%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-80%  41  21,84%  50  2,42%  8  ,24%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-70%  77  23,38%  99  4,40%  38  1,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-60%  72  24,82%  122  6,84%  42  1,84%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-50%  33  25,48%  92  8,68%  128  4,40%  7  ,14%  1  ,02%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-40%  86  27,20%  105  10,78%  189  8,18%  22  ,58%  5  ,12%  0  ,00%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-30%  71  28,62%  217  15,13%  280  13,79%  94  2,46%  39  ,90%  1  ,02%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-20%  119  31,00%  313  21,39%  422  22,23%  267  7,80%  208  5,06%  11  ,24%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
-10%  211  35,22%  448  30,35%  461  31,45%  645  20,71%  370  12,46%  233  4,90%  0  ,00%  0  ,00% 
0%  236  39,94%  693  44,22%  498  41,42%  1079  42,30%  583  24,13%  1206  29,02%  19  ,38%  106  2,12% 
10%  296  45,86%  878  61,78%  507  51,56%  1175  65,81%  719  38,52%  1644  61,90%  203  4,44%  2269  47,52% 
20%  397  53,80%  618  74,15%  464  60,84%  749  80,79%  567  49,86%  863  79,16%  639  17,23%  2001  87,56% 
30%  633  66,46%  374  81,63%  336  67,57%  379  88,38%  493  59,72%  360  86,36%  1097  39,18%  550  98,56% 
40%  414  74,74%  300  87,64%  307  73,71%  161  91,60%  354  66,81%  253  91,42%  1159  62,36%  65  99,86% 
50%  294  80,62%  210  91,84%  214  77,99%  94  93,48%  249  71,79%  129  94,00%  894  80,25%  7  100,00% 
60%  188  84,38%  79  93,42%  163  81,25%  64  94,76%  206  75,91%  95  95,90%  579  91,84%  0  100,00% 
70%  77  85,92%  78  94,98%  118  83,61%  42  95,60%  194  79,79%  32  96,54%  247  96,78%  0  100,00% 
80%  77  87,46%  37  95,72%  71  85,03%  28  96,16%  171  83,21%  26  97,06%  103  98,84%  0  100,00% 
90%  58  88,62%  13  95,98%  66  86,35%  8  96,32%  164  86,49%  32  97,70%  49  99,82%  0  100,00% 
100%  67  89,96%  40  96,78%  49  87,33%  8  96,48%  113  88,76%  53  98,76%  6  99,94%  0  100,00% 
110%  26  90,48%  18  97,14%  41  88,16%  16  96,80%  86  90,48%  33  99,42%  3  100,00%  0  100,00% 
120%  12  90,72%  9  97,32%  29  88,74%  18  97,16%  54  91,56%  9  99,60%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
130%  66  92,04%  19  97,70%  28  89,30%  9  97,34%  48  92,52%  7  99,74%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
140%  29  92,62%  17  98,04%  30  89,90%  17  97,68%  58  93,68%  5  99,84%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
150%  41  93,44%  11  98,26%  30  90,50%  10  97,88%  55  94,78%  4  99,92%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
160%  27  93,98%  0  98,26%  28  91,06%  12  98,12%  69  96,16%  1  99,94%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
170%  0  93,98%  0  98,26%  37  91,80%  6  98,24%  46  97,08%  1  99,96%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
180%  24  94,46%  0  98,26%  26  92,32%  1  98,26%  38  97,84%  1  99,98%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
190%  8  94,62%  7  98,40%  16  92,64%  3  98,32%  23  98,30%  0  99,98%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
200%  10  94,82%  0  98,40%  15  92,94%  13  98,58%  18  98,66%  0  99,98%  0  100,00%  0  100,00% 
over 
200% 259  100,00%  80  100,00%  353  100,00%  71  100,00%  67  100,00%  1  100,00%  0  100,00%  0  100,00%   38 
 
Table 6 – Comparison of “total-“, “private equity-“ and “stock market” risks 
The total risk is measured as the standard deviation of the private equity or the stock investment returns if no portfolios 
are built. The constrained market risk represents the standard deviation of in terms of the number of included 
investments (at least 200) fully-diversified portfolios, where no further risk diversification is possible by including 
more investments to the portfolio. In this scenario we compare pure private equity and pure stock portfolios. The 
analysis is done for all sub-samples. The relative diversifiable risk represents  diversifiable risk as a proportion of total 
risk. 
 
  Private Equity  Stock  Ratio  Private 
Equity 
Stock Ratio 
Sample  Vintage Years 1980-02  Private Equity without VC 
Total risk   260%  98%  264%  51%  42%  120% 
Constrained market risks  17,1% 7,1%  232%  29,7%  28%  106% 
rel. diversifiable risk [as portion of 
overall risk] 
93,40% 92,50%    94,20%  93,38%   
Sample  Vintage Years 1980-90  Venture Capital only 
Total risk   87%  54%  160%  330%  94%  349,66% 
Constrained market risks  5,8%  4,1% 139%  6,7%  19,3%  287% 
rel. diversifiable  [as portion of 
overall risk] 
93,33% 92,30%    94,15%  92,89%   
Sample  Vintage Years 1990-02  Early Stage investments 
Total risk   298%  121%  245%  328%  50%  651,68% 
Constrained market risks  20,8%  8,4% 246%  20,8% 3,3%  617% 
rel. diversifiable  risk [as portion of 
overall risk] 
93,01% 93,05%    93,65%  93,29%   
Sample  Realized before the end of 96  Mezzanine 
Total risk   88%  75%  116,6%  71%  56%  125,9% 
Constrained market risks  6,1% 4,9%  124%  5%  3,7%  134% 
rel. diversifiable risk [as portion of 
overall risk] 
93,04% 93,45%    93,29%  93,37%   
Sample  Realized after 96  Private Equity without Mezzanine 
Total risk   321,7%  111,8%  287,/%  291%  117%  248% 
Constrained market risks  23,78%  8,75% 271,7%  18,6%  7,8%  237% 
rel. diversifiable [as portion of 
overall risk] 
92,6% 92,17%   93,56%  93,36%   
Sample  Investments taken from funds, which are up to 
70% realized 
Investments taken from fully-realized 
Funds 
Total risk   76%  56%  136%  82,4%  70,7%  116% 
Constrained market risks  5,2%  3,9% 133,97%  6%  5,2%  115% 
rel. diversifiable risk [as portion of 
overall risk] 
93,15% 92,95%    92,71%  92,64%   
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Table 7.1 – Relative diversifiable risk reduction  
This table presents the results for the bootstrap simulation of private equity and benchmark portfolios with increasing 
size. The table presents the reduction of diversifiable risk. When we include 200 investments to the pure private equity 
(line 1) or the stock portfolio (line 2), all diversifiable risk is excluded. Z-values are given with 
8 /
0
δ
−
=
X
Z  and 
X =mean ∑
=
−
8
1 i
i i y x (x= non-systematic risk reduction level of PE portfolios at size-step i; y = non-systematic risk 
reduction level of benchmark portfolio at size-step i; i=1,2…8 for portfolio size =2,5….200 ) for testing the  null 
hypothesis “no difference in non-systematic risk reduction level between PE and the benchmark stock portfolios with 
increasing portfolio size”. The differences in the ratio of systematic risk and the ratio of full risk shows different 
diversifiable risk reduction benefits of private equity and their benchmark portfolios. With respect to changing 
investment horizons, we observed similar results for all subsets. 
 
Portfolio Size [number of investments]  2  5  10  15  20  50  100  200 
             
Sample  Vintage Years 1980-02                
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size  40,42%  62,58%  76,69%  81,51%  85,37%  92,85%  96,98%  100,0% 
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size 
[benchmark] 40,19%  57,08%  72,08%  80,51%  83,37%  92,42%  96,81%  100,0% 
Z-value (difference for diversifiable risk reduction with increasing portfolio size)        6,48   40 
Table 7.2 – Relative diversifiable risk reduction [investment stage] 
This table presents the results for the bootstrap simulation of private equity and benchmark portfolios with increasing 
size. The table presents the reduction of diversifiable risk. When we include 200 investments to the pure private equity 
(line 1) or the stock portfolio (line 2) all diversifiable risk is excluded. Z-values are given with 
8 /
0
δ
−
=
X
Z  and 
X =mean ∑
=
−
8
1 i
i i y x (x= non-systematic risk reduction level of PE portfolios at size-step i; y = non-systematic risk 
reduction level of benchmark portfolio at size-step i; i=1,2…8 for portfolio size =2,5….200 ) for testing the  null 
hypothesis “no difference in non-systematic risk reduction level between PE and the benchmark stock portfolios with 
increasing portfolio size”. The differences in the ratio of systematic risk and the ratio of full risk shows different 
diversifiable risk reduction benefits of private equity and their benchmark portfolios. With respect to changing 
investment horizons, we observed similar results for all subsets. 
 
Portfolio size [number of investments]  2  5  10  15  20  50  100  200 
             
Sample  Private Equity without VC                
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size  32,46%  58,64%  72,44%  78,39%  82,02%  91,71%  96,37%  99,92% 
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size 
[benchmark] 34,06%  62,06%  74,51%  80,30%  84,51%  92,77%  96,74%  99,95% 
Z-value (difference for non-systematic risk reduction with increasing portfolio size)        -10,987 
Sample  Venture Capital Only                   
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t portfolio size  31,16%  61,07%  74,43%  80,02%  83,47%  92,31%  96,67%  99,94% 
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size 
[benchmark] 29,21%  60,15%  73,58%  79,43%  83,56%  92,17%  96,69%  99,95% 
Z-value (difference non-systematic risk reduction with increasing portfolio size)        6,225 
Sample  Early Stage investments                
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size  30,86%  59,27%  73,19%  80,13%  83,17%  94,31%  96,74%  99,96% 
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size 
[benchmark]  27,66%  58,96%  72,32%  78,91%  82,87%  94,59%  96,63%  99,93% 
Z-value (difference non-systematic risk reduction with increasing portfolio size)        5,174 
Sample Mezzanine                      
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size  31,72%  59,69%  73,92%  80,03%  83,60%  92,58%  96,86%  100,00% 
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t. portfolio size 
[benchmark] 35,07%  62,87%  74,26%  80,55%  84,40%  92,54%  97,02%  99,86% 
Z-value (difference non-systematic risk reduction with increasing portfolio size)        -5,69 
Sample  Private Equity without Mezzanine                
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t portfolio size  38,39%  62,18%  76,86%  81,52%  85,53%  92,76%  97,07%  100,0% 
diversifiable risk reduction w.r.t portfolio size 
[benchmark] 26,24%  63,18%  74,94%  81,09%  85,27%  92,81%  97,04%  100,0% 
Z-value (difference non-systematic risk reduction with increasing portfolio size)        3,17 
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Table 8.1 – Mixed asset portfolios: minimum variance portfolios [sub-samples according to 
time period] 
This table presents the results for the bootstrap simulation of mixed asset portfolios combining private equity and 
stocks. Bootstrap samples = 5000. N=mixed asset portfolio size. Portfolios are built in order to minimize  portfolio 
return cross section variance. According to the private equity sample used, this table represents the optimal portfolio 
allocation to private equity in order to obtain minimum variance portfolios. Min. standard deviation is decreasing with 
increasing portfolio size. Market risk is reached when 200 investments in optimal portfolio weightings are included. 
The level of the mixed asset market risk is below the level of “PE-“ or “stock-market risk”. Correlation is measured 
between the return of each single private equity bootstrap portfolio (out of 5000) and its benchmark portfolios. With 
respect to investment timing and company characteristics, each single investment used to build benchmark portfolios 
corresponds exactly to one private equity investment. 
N 1  5  10  20  50  100 
200
 (approximated market risk)
           
Sample  Overall sample [Vintage Years 1980-02]           
Private Equity Weighting  12,00%  16,00%  17,00%  16,00%  15,00%  15,00%  16,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  92,31%  42,51%  29,81%  20,79%  13,13%  9,48%  6,66% 
Return 14,29%  15,46%  15,74%  15,53%  14,97%  15,29%  15,37% 
Correlation -0,011         
           
Sample  Vintage Years 1980-90                
Private Equity Weighting  28,00%  32,00%  33,00%  34,00%  34,00%  34,00%  34,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  45,61%  21,31%  15,12%  10,68%  6,70%  4,64%  3,37% 
Return 2,11%  2,66%  2,19%  2,23%  2,14%  2,20%  2,24% 
Correlation -0,045         
           
Sample  Vintage Years 1990-02                
Private Equity Weighting  15,00%  15,00%  15,00%  15,00%  14,00%  15,00%  14,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  112,03%  48,37%  34,65%  24,95%  15,76%  11,28%  7,86% 
Return 23,59%  21,75%  22,77%  22,57%  22,17%  22,67%  22,10% 
Correlation -0,016         
           
Sample  Realized before the end of 96              
Private Equity Weighting  43,00%  40,00%  41,00%  40,00%  40,00%  40,00%  39,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  55,42%  24,31%  16,39%  11,74%  7,56%  5,42%  3,76% 
Return 9,18%  8,95%  8,91%  8,94%  9,01%  8,94%  8,90% 
Correlation -0,047         
           
Sample  Realized after 1996                
Private Equity Weighting  11,00%  10,00%  11,00%  11,00%  11,00%  11,00%  11,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  105,50%  45,78%  32,68%  24,01%  15,55%  11,48%  8,34% 
Return 18,51%  17,13%  17,60%  17,90%  17,79%  17,78%  17,76% 
Correlation -0,0045         
           
Sample  Investments taken from funds which are up to 70% realized  
Private Equity Weighting  35,00%  33,00%  33,00%  33,00%  36,00%  34,00%  34,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  44,41%  19,54%  13,81%  10,16%  6,37%  4,54%  3,19% 
Return 5,98%  5,27%  5,33%  5,70%  5,68%  5,71%  5,65% 
Correlation -0,009         
           
Sample  Investments taken from fully-realized funds         
Private Equity Weighting  41,00%  44,00%  44,00%  44,00%  44,00%  44,00%  44,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  51,05%  22,75%  16,36%  11,42%  7,28%  5,22%  3,65% 
Return 4,95%  4,89%  4,70%  4,90%  4,73%  4,77%  4,81% 
Correlation -0,096             
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Table 8.2 - Mixed asset portfolios: minimum variance portfolios [sub-samples according to 
investment stage] 
This table presents the results for the bootstrap simulation of mixed asset portfolios combining private equity and 
stocks. Bootstrap samples = 5000. N=mixed asset portfolio size. Portfolios are built in order to minimize portfolio 
return cross section variance. According to the private equity sample used, this table represents the optimal portfolio 
allocation to private equity in order to obtain minimum variance portfolios. Min. standard deviation is decreasing with 
increasing portfolio size. Market risk is reached when 200 investments in optimal portfolio weights are included. The 
level of the mixed asset market risk is below the level of “PE“ or “stock-market risk”. Correlation is measured between 
the return of each single private equity bootstrap portfolio (out of 5000) and its benchmark portfolios. With respect to 
investment timing and company characteristics, each single investment used to build benchmark portfolios corresponds 
exactly to one private equity investment. 
N 1  5  10  20  50  100 
200 
(approximated market risk)
Sample  Private Equity without VC                
Private Equity Weighting  37,00%  37,00%  35,00%  35,00%  38,00%  39,00%  46,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  36,95%  15,66%  11,28%  7,77%  4,78%  3,38%  2,32% 
Return 7,51%  6,82%  6,96%  6,87%  6,95%  6,97%  7,06% 
Correlation 0,255         
           
Sample  Venture Capital Only                
Private Equity Weighting  6,00%  8,00%  9,00%  9,00%  9,00%  11,00%  11,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  90,86%  39,99%  28,55%  20,12%  12,89%  8,98%  6,34% 
Return 14,17%  14,11%  14,47%  14,77%  14,67%  15,39%  15,39% 
Correlation 0,0063         
           
Sample  Early Stage investments                
Private Equity Weighting  3,00%  3,00%  3,00%  3,00%  2,00%  3,00%  3,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  49,77%  22,36%  16,20%  11,24%  5,86%  4,85%  3,34% 
Return 1,94%  2,88%  3,09%  3,17%  2,81%  3,09%  3,09% 
Correlation -0,0065         
           
Sample Mezzanine                    
Private Equity Weighting  37,00%  35,00%  37,00%  35,00%  37,00%  37,00%  36,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  45,23%  18,97%  13,96%  9,90%  6,23%  4,40%  3,13% 
Return 14,27%  12,84%  13,82%  12,88%  13,53%  13,48%  13,29% 
Correlation 0,048         
           
Sample  Private Equity without Mezzanine             
Private Equity Weighting   15,00%  14,00%  16,00%  15,00%  14,00%  15,00%  14,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  108,13%  44,78%  32,52%  22,10%  14,57%  10,08%  6,96% 
Return 17,94%  15,71%  16,76%  16,30%  16,28%  16,64%  16,20% 
Correlation -0,013         
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Table 9.1 - Mixed asset portfolios: maximum performance ratio [subamples according to 
period] 
This table presents the results for the bootstrap simulation of mixed asset portfolios including private equity and 
stocks. Bootstrap sample = 5000. N=mixed asset portfolio size. Portfolios are built in order to maximize performance 
ratio (return/risk). According to the private equity sample used, this table represents the optimal portfolio allocation to 
private equity in order to obtain maximum performance ratio portfolios. With respect to investment timing and 
company characteristics, each single investment used to build benchmark portfolios corresponds exactly to one private 
equity investment. 
N 1  5  10  20  50  100  200 
             
Sample  Overall sample [Vintage Years 1980-02]     
Private Equity Weighting  34,00%  37,00%  38,00%  36,00%  35,00%  36,00%  37,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  18,54%  42,32%  60,68%  86,00%  131,85%  187,40%  266,24% 
             
Sample Vintage  Years  1980-90 
Private Equity Weighting  5,00%  8,00%  3,00%  2,00%  0,00%  0,00%  2,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  5,24%  14,19%  18,35%  25,79%  40,12%  59,95%  80,98% 
             
Sample Vintage  Years  1990-02 
Private Equity Weighting  38,00%  38,00%  36,00%  37,00%  36,00%  38,00%  38,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  25,21%  53,68%  77,18%  106,82%  166,71%  238,45%  338,09% 
             
Sample  Realized before the end of 96 
Private Equity Weighting  35,00%  35,00%  36,00%  34,00%  35,00%  34,00%  34,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  16,74%  37,03%  54,67%  76,73%  119,89%  166,38%  238,20% 
             
Sample  Realized after 1997         
Private Equity Weighting  38,00%  38,00%  39,00%  40,00%  41,00%  43,00%  45,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  23,54%  51,29%  72,59%  102,50%  159,77%  220,52%  306,25% 
             
Sample  Investments taken from funds, which are up to 70% realized 
Private Equity Weighting  36,00%  37,00%  35,00%  36,00%  37,00%  36,00%  36,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  13,46%  27,03%  38,66%  56,26%  89,23%  125,83%  177,61% 
             
Sample  Investments taken from fully-realized funds      
Private Equity Weighting  26,00%  30,00%  28,00%  29,00%  28,00%  28,00%  29,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  10,21%  22,41%  30,58%  44,83%  68,80%  97,37%  138,97% 
 
 
Table 9.2 - Mixed asset portfolios: maximum performance ratio [sub-samples according to 
period] 
This table presents the results for the bootstrap simulation of mixed asset portfolios including private equity and 
stocks. Bootstrap sample = 5000. N=mixed asset portfolio size. Portfolios are built in order to maximize the 
performance ratio (return/risk). According to the private equity sample used, this table represents the optimal portfolio 
allocation to private equity in order to obtain maximum performance ratio portfolios. With respect to investment 
timing and company characteristics, each single investment used to build benchmark portfolios corresponds exactly to 
one private equity investment. 
N 1  5  10  20  50  100  200 
Sample  Private Equity without VC 
Private Equity Weighting  41,00%  40,00%  37,00%  40,00%  44,00%  48,00%  53,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  20,37%  43,49%  61,79%  88,72%  146,24%  208,06%  306,26% 
             
Sample   Venture Capital Only 
Private Equity Weighting  27,00%  28,00%  29,00%  28,00%  30,00%  31,00%  34,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  20,28%  44,09%  62,24%  89,31%  142,28%  207,96%  305,16% 
               44 
Sample  Early Stage investments 
Private Equity Weighting  19,00%  19,00%  18,00%  18,00%  18,00%  19,00%  19,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  7,74%  18,41%  26,58%  39,54%  69,91%  92,27%  134,90% 
             
Sample Mezzanine 
Private Equity Weighting  62,00%  62,00%  63,00%  65,00%  64,00%  63,00%  65,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  34,54%  77,33%  111,46%  150,40%  245,39%  343,19%  485,89% 
             
Sample  Private Equity without Mezzanine 
Private Equity Weighting  36,00%  37,00%  37,00%  35,00%  35,00%  35,00%  34,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  19,53%  41,46%  59,59%  84,88%  131,02%  191,27%  272,53% 
             
 
Table 10 – Net IRR descriptive statistics 
We calculated net IRR distributions at the company level by subtracting a 20% carried interest on capital gains after 
the 100% distribution of invested capital. The management fee is not recognized since similar management fees are 
incurred while managing stock portfolios. Owing mainly to a charge of carried interest on the basis of cumulated fund 
cash flows, the results are worst case scenarios. In reality negative performing investments delay the overall positive 
funds cash flow and therefore the need to pay carried interest. OwingDue to a portfolio simulation we cannot consider 
this fact. We calculate carried interest payments for each portfolio company.    
 
Net IRR  
Sample: vintage year 1980-02 
  
Mean 25,62%
Median 12,22%
Modus -1
St. Deviation  1,98039577
Variance 3,92196741
Kurtosis 74,5760158
Skewness 7,42834613
Range 25,5962366
Minimum -100,00%
Maximum 2459,62%
Frequency of total lost  19,16%
Sample size  642
 0,15348056
 
 
Table 11 – optimal weights (calculated on net IRR basis) 
 
N 1  5  10  20  50  100  200 
Sample  Full Sample (net) 
Min. variance portfolios 
Private Equity Weighting  21,00%  20,00%  25,00%  15,00%  21,00%  21,00%  19,00% 
Min. St. Dev.  90,08%  40,04%  29,97%  19,64%  12,44%  9,00%  6,16% 
Return 14,44%  14,19%  15,61%  14,42%  14,29%  14,49%  14,25% 
Max. performance ratio portfolios 
Private Equity Weighting  36,00%  36,00%  40,00%  37,00%  36,00%  36,00%  35,00% 
Max Performance Ratio  17,08%  38,26%  55,26%  78,07%  122,35%  172,50%  249,65% 
               45 
 
Table 12 – MIRR descriptive statistics 
Modified IRR calculation is based on an assumed reinvestment rate of 5%. 
Modified IRR   sample "vintage year 1980-02" 
   PE  Stocks 
    
Mean 14,37%  4,26% 
Median 11,14%  4,73% 
Modus -1  #NV 
St. Deviation  1,33012028  0,05845256 
Variance 1,76921997  0,003416702 
Kurtosis 43,3290348  22,02522813 
Skewness 5,55898307  -2,818507972 
Range 15,0992932  0,779563791 
Minimum -100%  -56,26% 
Maximum 1409,92%  21,69% 
Frequency of total lost  19,16%  0,78% 
Sample size  642  642 
Confidence Level (95,0%)  0,10308425  0,00453007   46 
Figures 
 
Figure 1 – IRR distribution private equity vs. stocks 
 
Frequency distribution of the complete samples' private equity and their benchmark stocks investment returns [both 
measured in IRR].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – IRR Distribution private equity 
 
Frequency distribution of the complete samples' ‘venture capital’ and ‘private equity without venture capital’ 
[MBO/LBO/MBI/Turnaround] investment returns [both measured in IRR].  
 
IRR Distributions
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-100%
-40%
20%
80%
140%
200%
260%
320%
380%
440%
500%
560%
620%
680%
740%
800%
860%
920%
IRR Class
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
[
i
n
 
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
s
]
VC
PE w/t VC
 
Frequency di stri buti on
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
-
1
-
0
,
1
0
,
8
1
,
7
2
,
6
3
,
5
4
,
4
5
,
3
6
,
2
7
,
1
8
8
,
9
I RR Cl ass 
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
[
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
]
Pr i v at e Equ i t y
Benchm ark stocks  47 
 
Figure 3 – Naive diversification effects with increasing portfolio size  
 
Portfolio cross section standard deviation diversification effects when increasing the overall portfolio size. Sample: 
complete sample including 642 US-American private equity investments 
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Figure 4 - Portfolio frequency distribution: portfolio size = 5 
 
Frequency distribution of  a 5 asset portfolios consisting exclusively of private equity or benchmark stocks.  This 
frequency distribution is taken from the sample “vintage years 1980-2002”. 
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Figure 5 - Portfolio frequency distribution: portfolio size = 20 
 
Frequency distribution of a 20 asset portfolios consisting exclusively of private equity or benchmark stocks.  This 
frequency distribution is taken from the sample “vintage years 1980-2002”. 
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Figure 6 – Portfolio frequency distribution: portfolio size = 200 
 
Frequency distribution of a 200 asset portfolio consisting exclusively of private equity or benchmark stocks.  This 
frequency distribution is taken from the sample “vintage years 1980-2002”. 
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Figure 7 – Efficient frontiers 
 
Efficient frontiers generated in accordance with changing allocations to private equity and benchmark stocks (small 
caps). Investments of different private equity categories are mixed with stocks to build efficient portfolios. Overall 
portfolio size: 20 assets.  
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Figure 8 – naive diversification effects 
 
Portfolio cross section standard deviation diversification effects when increasing the overall portfolio size. Sample: 
complete sample including 642 US-American private equity investments 
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Figure 9 – Diversification effects of mixed portfolios with increasing size  
 
Diversification effects when increasing the portfolio size of mixed asset portfolios. N = overall portfolio size. 
Return/risk of the following portfolio combinations: 100% stocks: return=11.34% st. deviation=46.52% [N=5] 
32.84% [N=10]%; 100% PE: return: 37.01% st. deviation=108% [N=5] 74% [N=10]; 83% stocks / 17% PE: 
return=15.46% st. deviation=42.51% [N=5] 29.84% [N=10]; 50% stocks / 50% PE: return =24,18% st. 
deviation=58.56% [N=5] 40.14% [N=10]. 
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Figure 10 – Performance ratio with increasing portfolio allocation to private equity 
 
Performance ratio (average portfolio return/cross section standard deviation) changes when the allocation to private 
equity is increased (complete sample out of 642 investments). N= overall portfolio size 
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Figure 11 – log. performance ratio with increasing portfolio allocation to private equity 
 
Log performance ratio (average portfolio return/cross section standard deviation) changes when  the allocation to 
private equity is increased (complete sample out of 642 investments). N= overall portfolio size. 
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Appendix 
 
The bootstrap approach 
 
We use the following algorithm:  
Sample: ( ) .... , 1 n PE PE ;  ) ... ( , 1 n S S ; for n=642, each from empirical distribution F ˆ , describing 
individual private equity or stock investments 
PE  =  IRR of Private Equity investments 
S   =   IRR of simultaneous stock investments 
n   =  number of PE and benchmark investment   
 
Simulation of pure private equity portfolios: 
 
First, we select B= 5000 independent bootstrap samples 
1 *
m x , 
2 *
m x , …., 
B
m x
* each consisting 
of m= 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 50, 100, 200, 300, 500 (simulated portfolio size) data values, each 
describing one investment return. 
*
m x  is a vector of m PE investment returns. Each vector 
} {
b
m
b x x
* *
1 ,...  is a random sample from  } { n PE PE ,... 1  The sample is drawn with replacement from the 
empirical distribution F ˆ (nonparametric estimate of the real population F).
49 We calculate for each 
vector the average portfolio return, 
b
m x
* =mean∑
=
m
i
b
i x
1
* , for b = 1…B. 
50 As a result we get 5000 
portfolio returns each consisting of m investments. We are able to determine the quartile 
distribution of portfolio returns. 
  
Second, our parameter of interest is θ =t(F). It is the empirical estimate 
* ˆ θ =s(
b
m x
* )=
B
x
B
i
m
b
∑
=1
*
=
m
F ˆ µ , b=1,2,..B. We get varying 
m
F ˆ µ  for each portfolio size m= 1, 2, 5, 10, 
…, 500.
51  
 
Third, we estimate seF(θ ) by sample standard deviation of the B replications for each 
portfolio size m=1, 2, 5, 10,…, 500  
 
) 1 (
] ) ( ˆ [
ˆ
2
1
ˆ
*
−
−
=
∑
=
B
b
e s
B
b
m
F
m
µ θ
.
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Simulation of stock portfolios: 
 
According to the methodology of PE portfolio simulation we generate the bootstrap 
sample
1 *
m y ,
2 *
m y ,….
B
m y
* as a random sample from  } ... { , 1 n S S . With respect to the chosen 
                                                 
49  See Efron (1993), pp. 45-47 
50  Shao, J. / Dongsheng, T (1995), pp. 207 
51  Following Efron (1993), pp. 45-47 
52 See Efron (1993), pp. 47   53 
benchmark investments, this bootstrap sample corresponds exactly to the PE bootstrap 
sample.  
 
Simulation of mixed portfolios with different asset allocations (Private Equity VC and 
stocks [S]) 
 
First, we select B= 5000 independent pairs of bootstrap samples 
1 *
m x ,
1 *
m y ;
2 *
m x ,
2 *
m y ; 
….; 
B
m x
* ,
B
m y
* each consisting of m= 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, …500 data values drawn with 
replacement from the empirical distribution F ˆ . Each pair 
b
m x
* b
m y
*  represents the IRRs of 
both one PE portfolio with size m and its time and cash flow equivalent portfolio investment 
in benchmark stocks. As before,  } {
b
m
b x x
* *
1 ,...  i s  a  r a n d o m  s a m p l e  f r o m   } { n n PE PE ,...  
and } {
b
m
b y y
* *
1 ,...  is the corresponding random sample from  } {
n S S ,...
1 ). We calculate for each 
bootstrap sample the average return as follows: 
b
m x
* =mean∑
=
m
i
b
i x
1
* ,
b
m y
* =mean∑
=
m
i
b
i y
1
* ; m=1, 
2, 5, 10, 20, …500 
 
Second, we built mixed asset portfolios with different portfolio sizes m and PE 
weightingss  α . Each mixed asset portfolio return is calculated as   
fα ,m,b(
b
m x
* ,
b
m y
* )=α
b
m x
* +(1-α )
b
m y
* ,
53 for m=1, 2, 5,…500 and α =0.01; 0.02; …0.99.  
 
Third, we determine the empirical estimate of average mixed asset portfolio return 
* ˆ θ =s(fα ,m,b (
b
m x
* ,
b
m y
* ))=
α µ
,
ˆ
m
F  over each bootstrap sample: b=5000 with size m=1, 2, 
5,…500 and  99 . 0 ;.... 01 . 0 = α . Additionally, we estimate seF(θ ) by sample standard deviation 
of the B replications for each portfolio size m=1, 2, 5, …500  
 
) 1 (
] ) ( ˆ [
ˆ
2
1
,
ˆ
*
,
−
−
=
∑
=
B
b
e s
B
b
m
F
m
B
α
α
µ θ
 for m=1, 2, 5, …500 and  5 . 0 ;....; 01 . 0 = α  
 
Knowing the mean Bootstrap returns and standard deviations for mixed portfolios with 
changing asset weights, we can outline the efficient frontier. Remember that each mixed 
portfolio is the weighted composition of one pure PE portfolio and one pure stock portfolio 
with the same portfolio size. Again, both portfolios consist of the same number of PE or stock 
investments with exact investment and distribution timing. With respect to timing and all other 
benchmark criteria, both portfolios are exactly comparable. Therefore, the results are not 
diluted by diversification effects due to investment date differences. Furthermore, we 
determine correlations between both asset classes by confronting completely comparable 
benchmark returns. To test the results for robustness we repeat the steps from above with 
                                                 
53 See Cochrane, p. 12, for methodology of portfolio formation composed of fraction w in a VC investment and 
fraction (1-w) in an risk free return   54 
reduced sample ( ) .... , 1 n PE PE  and the corresponding stock performance sample  ) ... ( , 1 n S S  
(n<642). 
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